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META RIGHTS 
Charlotte Garden* 
 
Are individuals entitled to notice of their constitutional rights or 
assistance in exercising those rights?  In most contexts, the answer is no.  
Yet, there are some important exceptions, in which the U.S. Supreme Court 
has held that special circumstances call for notice and procedural 
protections designed to facilitate rights invocations.  This Article refers to 
these entitlements as “meta rights”—rights that protect rights.  The most 
famous of these is the Miranda warning, which notifies suspects of their 
Fifth Amendment rights to silence and an attorney.  There are others as 
well—among them, the First Amendment right of individuals represented by 
public sector labor unions and bar associations to notice of their right not 
to subsidize certain union or bar association speech.  Certain procedural 
due process rights also qualify as meta rights, including the notice of the 
right to litigate individually to which many class members are entitled. 
The reason for the Miranda warning, as well as for similar notice rights 
in the procedural due process context, is clear:  each aids individuals in 
overcoming high external barriers to protecting their own rights through 
self-help.  But what justifies meta rights that help union members and 
attorneys exercise their rights against compelled subsidization of political 
speech, where there are generally no significant barriers to self-help?  
Alternatively, why aren’t there meta rights in other compelled speech and 
subsidization contexts?  And, if meta rights are appropriate, how robust 
should they be? 
This Article takes up these questions, arguing that the self-help rationale 
offers a way to determine when meta rights are required in various 
constitutional contexts, including in the context of compelled speech and 
subsidization of speech.  It then addresses the challenges inherent in 
structuring meta rights, which are accentuated where meta rights are owed 
by private associations—such as unions and bar associations—that have 
their own First Amendment rights.  Ultimately, this Article argues that 
courts cannot ignore the competing interests of associational speakers and 
willing members when they determine the scope of meta rights in the 
 
*  Assistant Professor, Seattle University School of Law.  For their suggestions and 
encouragement, I am grateful to Robert Chang, Brooke Coleman, Owen Davies, David 
Gartner, Nancy Leong, Christina Parajon, Anna Roberts, Andrew Siegel, David Skover, and 
the participants in the Washington University School of Law Faculty Workshop Series; 
participants in the 2013 Law and Society annual conference; and participants in the Young 
Scholars ―Schmooze‖ with Mark Tushnet at the National Convention of the American 
Constitution Society. 
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compelled speech and subsidization context.  Thus, to the extent that courts 
conclude that meta rights themselves implicate the First Amendment, they 
should account for the possibility that some meta rights do more than just 
allow dissenters to avoid unwanted speech:  they actually encourage opt-
outs, and correspondingly discourage speech. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Constitutional ―meta rights‖—notice and process rights that are coupled 
with substantive constitutional rights—exist in just a handful of contexts.  
The U.S. Supreme Court has not explained why this is so, though there are 
clues to be divined from cases mandating meta rights in particular contexts.  
Likewise, while scholars have filled volumes about the scope of meta rights 
in particular contexts, this Article is the first to compare the Court‘s 
differing approaches to these rights across contexts. 
This Article begins by considering one area in which the Court has not 
only established a meta right but also offered a detailed justification for it:  
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the Miranda warning.1  It then turns to the closely analogous issue of 
procedural due process rights, and in particular absent class members‘ 
entitlement to notice of their opt-out rights.  These examples, grounded 
respectively in the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment, illustrate that 
meta rights are usually found where rights-holders cannot otherwise engage 
in self-help, either because of coercion or because they lack necessary 
facts—a condition this Article argues is the critical determinant of whether 
meta rights should be required in a given context. 
This Article then applies the lessons of Miranda and class action notice 
rights to First Amendment rights against compelled speech and 
subsidization, where the Court has held, without explanation, that meta 
rights are called for only sporadically.  In other words, while dissenters 
often have rights against compelled speech or subsidization, only some 
institutional speakers are constitutionally required not just to tolerate dissent 
but also to facilitate it.  For example, labor unions must annually provide 
notice and procedural protections to represented employees who have a 
right not to pay for union political speech.2  Bar associations are in theory 
required to provide the same protections to attorneys,3 though they often 
fall short in practice.4  Yet, public school students are not entitled to notice 
of their First Amendment right not to say the Pledge of Allegiance, even 
though students are more vulnerable to coercion than either employees or 
attorneys.5 
After considering the availability of self-help in these contexts, the 
Article concludes that meta rights, if available at all with respect to 
compelled speech and subsidization, should be distributed differently than 
they are now.  In particular, the most vulnerable potential dissenters—
school children—do not currently receive meta rights but have the strongest 
case for them; while the least vulnerable—food producers participating in 
certain generic advertising schemes—do not need the protections they now 
receive.  Workers and attorneys fall in between those groups:  they do not 
face significant coercion but sometimes face informational deficits.  
However, even if these deficits justify some meta rights in the union and 
bar association context, the Court‘s recent decision6 strengthening the meta 
rights that unions owe represented workers significantly exceeds the 
justification for those meta rights.  Worse, if one accepts the Court‘s 
premise that the First Amendment requires strengthened meta rights in 
order to discourage workers from sleeping on their rights, then the Court‘s 
own cure for that problem is as bad as the disease, because it will similarly 
harm a different set of workers—those who sleep on their rights to speak. 
 
 1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see also infra Part I.B.1. 
 2. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234–35 (1977); see also infra Part 
I.C.1. 
 3. Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1990); see also infra Part I.C.2. 
 4. See infra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 5. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); see also infra Part I.D.1. 
 6. See Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int. Union Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012). 
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Given these considerations, and assuming meta rights are at least 
sometimes called for in the compelled speech context, what should they 
entail?  Here, there are two possibilities:  first, notice; and second, structural 
protections that set behavioral constraints designed to prompt (or 
discourage) rights invocations.  Both notice and structural meta rights in the 
First Amendment context raise challenging questions regarding the rights of 
private associational speakers.  First, notice rights often call for compelled 
speech, implicating associations‘ rights.7  Second, structural rights, like the 
opt-in default that applies in the context of certain union dues increases, 
raise another set of concerns.  Behavioral science shows that defaults are 
not neutral; instead, they are behavioral prompts that encourage individuals 
to make one decision over another.8  So, if speech-promoting defaults 
violate the First Amendment—as the Court recently held in one context9— 
then so should speech-discouraging defaults.  Put another way, either none 
of these defaults violate the First Amendment, and thus can be left to either 
legislatures or private ordering, or all of them do.  However, all is not lost 
even if the Court concludes that all speech defaults implicate the First 
Amendment, because careful design of meta rights can minimize 
infringements on speakers‘ rights and interests while still protecting 
dissenters.10 
This Article proceeds in two parts.  Part I defines meta rights and 
discusses their scope in the Miranda and compelled speech and 
subsidization contexts, as well as the closely related procedural due process 
context.11  Then, in Part II, the Article argues that the availability of First 
Amendment meta rights should turn on whether underlying rights can 
reasonably be invoked through self-help, and should be structured to 
minimize interference with willing speakers. 
I.   RIGHTS AND META RIGHTS 
This part begins with a brief general discussion of meta rights, defining 
them and differentiating them from other types of constitutional rights.  
Next, it turns to two key areas of constitutional law regarding notice and 
process rights:  first, the right against self-incrimination; and second, 
procedural due process, particularly the example of class action notice 
rights.  Finally, it turns to compelled speech and subsidization of speech, 
where courts have imposed meta rights only sporadically, and without 
meaningful explanation.  This Part provides the basis for Part II, which 
critiques the Court‘s distribution of meta rights in the compelled speech 
context and proposes a better way forward. 
 
 7. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 8. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 9. See Knox, 132 S. Ct. 2277. 
 10. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 11. The analogy between meta rights and procedural due process rights prior to 
deprivations of property or liberty is a close one.  Moreover, some procedural due process 
rights—including the right to the class action notice, on which I focus as an example—fits 
the definition of a meta right. 
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A.   Defining Meta Rights 
Meta rights, which require potential rights infringers to help others 
invoke their rights by providing notice or other protections, are derived 
from the same source as the substantive rights that they protect.  Probably 
the most famous meta right is the Miranda warning, which notifies 
individuals undergoing custodial interrogation of their Fifth Amendment 
rights against self-incrimination.12  The idea is that Miranda makes rights 
invocation easier (and therefore more likely) by informing those undergoing 
custodial interrogation that they are entitled to choose to remain silent and 
that making a different choice may have negative consequences.13  Thus, 
meta rights eliminate certain barriers to rights invocation.14 
Meta rights can be based in legislation or the Constitution.  While this 
Article is concerned with constitutional meta rights, statutory meta rights 
are relatively common.  For example, employers are required to inform 
employees about a host of workplace rights arising under statutes such as 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act15 and the Fair Labor Standards Act.16  
These statutory protections reflect congressional or administrative 
judgments that particular rights or entitlements will be better respected and 
more robustly enforced if potential violators must tell potential victims 
about their rights.17 
In contrast to Congress or the Executive, courts generally proceed as 
though individuals are aware of their constitutional rights, whether or not 
this assumption is borne out empirically.18  Thus, constitutional meta rights 
 
 12. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–68 (1966). 
 13. This is not to say that the Miranda warning makes rights invocation objectively easy. 
See, e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register:  The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in 
Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 260–61 (1993) (demonstrating challenges 
associated with invoking Miranda rights and arguing that these difficulties will be amplified 
for women and minorities). 
 14. In other contexts, both courts and commentators commonly recognize the value of 
structures that improve individuals‘ abilities to understand the scope of their rights.  The 
common law system of precedent is such a structure.  As one commentator has observed: 
The protection of settled expectations is among the most prevalent justifications 
for deferring to precedent.  When a court issues an opinion, stakeholders modify 
their behaviors in response.  Judicial delineation of the applicable rules affects 
commercial activities such as the formation of contracts, allocation of investments, 
and organization of business operations.  It influences governmental decisions 
such as the crafting of legislation designed to foster democratic objectives within 
lawful bounds.  It even affects societal understandings regarding the content of the 
legal backdrop against which citizens arrange their lives. 
Randy J. Kozel, Settled Versus Right:  Constitutional Method and the Path of Precedent, 91 
TEX. L. REV. 1843, 1855 (2013). 
 15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-10 (2012). 
 16. 29 C.F.R. § 516.4 (2014). 
 17. Meta rights could have multiple beneficial effects, in addition to educating 
individuals about their rights:  first, the process of notifying individuals of their rights could 
serve an educative function for institutions themselves, thereby preventing inadvertent 
violations; and second, having to provide notice could make institutions acutely aware that 
individuals know their rights, which could itself deter violations. 
 18. See, e.g., infra note 61 and accompanying text.  A significant body of literature 
shows that where warnings are not required, individuals often are not aware of their rights to 
avoid encounters with police. E.g., Devon W. Carbado, (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 
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are unusual.  Where they exist, they are generally announced by courts in 
the course of articulating substantive constitutional protections.19  Yet, it 
may not be apparent from the constitutional text itself that meta rights are 
required;20 further, as discussed in the remainder of this Article, the Court 
shapes meta rights in response to a range of concerns, both constitutional 
and practical. 
Despite their common source, meta rights are distinct from the 
substantive rights that they protect.  Analyzing meta rights in Hohfeldian21 
terms clarifies the distinction.  Consider the First Amendment context:  
First Amendment rights are generally ―privileges‖—rights that protect 
individuals‘ choices to speak or not speak against interference by the 
government, but do not impose affirmative duties on the government to 
furnish individuals with opportunities for speech or silence.22  But a right to 
receive notice of one‘s First Amendment rights is a ―claim‖ right—one that 
corresponds to a duty owed by the government,23 or, in some compelled 
 
100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 1023 (2002) (arguing that the Court‘s own analysis reflects the idea 
that people who do not know their constitutional rights are likely to feel compelled to assent 
to a police officer‘s request for permission to search); Lewis R. Katz, “Lonesome Road”:  
Driving Without the Fourth Amendment, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1413, 1466 (2013) 
(asserting that the Court‘s body of law regarding consensual searches is ―based upon a 
misperception that Americans know their rights‖). 
 19. Some meta rights first articulated by the Court are later shaped or enhanced by 
legislatures. See infra Part II.B.  As I discuss below, the Due Process Clause mandates that 
absent class members in certain class actions receive notice and an opportunity to opt out of 
the class. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).  However, the 
notice procedure is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2), which tracks the 
Due Process requirements. See infra Part I.B.2.  Likewise, some state legislatures mandate 
more robust protections for objecting union members than are required by the Court. See 
infra Part I.C.1. 
 20. For example, the Court only recently clarified that the warnings announced in 
Miranda are constitutionally required.  Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438 (2000) 
(holding that Miranda announced a constitutional rule, but acknowledging that the Court 
had, in previous cases, used language suggesting Miranda was subconstitutional).  Before 
Dickerson, a significant body of scholarship debated the constitutional status of the Miranda 
warning. See Jennifer E. Laurin, Rights Translation and Remedial Disequilibrium in 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1044 & n.162, 1045 (2010) 
(aggregating articles articulating both sides of the debate over Miranda); see also Joseph D. 
Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure:  A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 
NW. U. L. REV. 100, 106–07 (1985) (arguing that Miranda warnings are not constitutionally 
required, and that Miranda‘s prophylactic rule was illegitimate); David A. Strauss, The 
Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 195 (1988) (critiquing Grano‘s 
argument). 
 21. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld famously constructed a taxonomy of rights, 
distinguishing between claims, liberties, authorities, and immunities. See generally Wesley 
N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 
YALE L.J. 16 (1913). 
 22. See Hohfeld, supra note 21, at 32 (defining ―privilege‖ as an entitlement to take an 
action without interference and distinguishing a privilege from a claim right, which 
corresponds to an affirmative duty that someone else must undertake); Frederick Schauer, 
Hohfeld’s First Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 914, 916 (2008) (noting that the First 
Amendment is ―a privilege or a liberty in Hohfeldian language‖ and ―not a right to have the 
actual opportunity to speak, nor is it a right to have a platform for speaking, nor is it the right 
to have an audience‖). 
 23. See infra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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speech contexts, a union or bar association.  That is, where individuals are 
entitled to notice of their rights not to speak, there is a corresponding duty 
to provide notice that is imposed on an institutional speaker.24  The same is 
true of the Fifth Amendment right to avoid self-incrimination:  it is a 
privilege, which means that the government cannot interfere with the 
privilege where it exists, though it is not bound by any affirmative duty to 
provide opportunities for silence.  On the other hand, the right to receive the 
Miranda warning is a claim right that correlates with a duty to provide the 
warning.25 
This distinction is significant because it underscores that meta rights are 
distinct from rights.  Nonetheless, they are often discussed interchangeably, 
or as though the meta right is merely an extension of the right.  However, 
this conflation obscures the unusual and distinct nature of court-created 
meta rights and prevents them from being understood together as a class.  
Accordingly, I discuss in the next section existing rights and meta rights, 
focusing on the Court‘s rationale for providing the latter.  I then turn to the 
First Amendment right not to speak or subsidize speech, where meta rights 
exist only sporadically, and without explanation. 
B.   Baseline Meta Rights 
Although constitutional meta rights are relatively rare, some important 
exceptions stand out.26  This section begins with the Miranda warning, 
which is the most thoroughly explained meta right.  I then turn to 
procedural due process rights, focusing in particular on the right of certain 
class members to receive notice of their opt-out and objection rights.  As I 
discuss, not all procedural due process rights qualify as meta rights.  
However, procedural due process is a helpful reference point in considering 
why the Court sometimes views notice and other protections as critical to 
allowing individuals to invoke their substantive rights. 
Finally, while the Miranda warning and class action notice right are 
grounded, respectively, in the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination and Due Process, they each involve, in a sense, rights to 
 
 24. Hohfeld, supra note 21, at 31–32 (a ―claim right‖ correlates with a duty owed by 
another); Schauer, supra note 22, at 916 (―[A] positive right is one for which there is a claim 
on the state to provide just that which the right guarantees.‖). 
 25. See Laurent Sacharoff, Miranda’s Hidden Right, 63 ALA. L. REV. 535, 540 (2012) 
(―At the core of the Fifth Amendment lies a Hohfeldian ‗liberty,‘ the liberty not to speak.  
On the perimeter, protecting the liberty like soldiers, stand several Hohfeldian ‗claims.‘‖). 
 26. In addition to the meta rights discussed in this Article, other meta rights have been 
established in connection with criminal trials, where notice of constitutional rights is often 
provided either by judges or by constitutionally guaranteed counsel.  For example, a robust 
meta rights regime discourages criminal defendants from waiving their right to counsel 
during a trial. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (holding that defendants have a 
right to represent themselves, but underscoring that the waiver of the right to counsel must 
be knowing and voluntary, and requiring that the defendant be ―made aware of the dangers 
and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that ‗he knows 
what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open‘‖).  However, I focus on Miranda 
and class action notice and opt-out rights because of the close analogy that can be drawn 
between these situations and the right to avoid compelled speech or subsidization. 
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silence—to refrain from participating in police interrogation, or to refrain 
from litigation (or shape one‘s own lawsuit), which is a form of petitioning 
under the First Amendment that can also constitute expressive advocacy.27  
Thus, the Court‘s rationale for creating meta rights in each of these areas 
can lend important insights to the development of meta rights in the 
compelled speech and subsidization context. 
1.   Miranda Warnings 
Miranda v. Arizona28 established the mandatory Miranda warning, a 
meta right to notice that will be familiar to anyone who has ever watched a 
police procedural.  Like the body of law governing the Miranda warning, 
the volume of scholarly literature analyzing the decision and its 
consequences is massive.29  However, scholars have not focused on the 
similarities between the Miranda warning and decisions finding meta rights 
in other contexts. 
Why give suspects information about their constitutional rights, rather 
than either assuming that they are constructively aware of their rights or 
relying on the suspects themselves to ask for clarification?  The Miranda 
Court answered this question in some detail.  It began by listing the 
conditions that were critical to its conclusion that a warning was required:  
―incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated 
atmosphere.‖30  The Court then explained the significance of these 
conditions and their deleterious effect on the ―individual‘s right to choose 
between silence and speech.‖31  It stressed that police are specially trained 
to convince suspects to waive their constitutional right to remain silent and 
decide to ―talk,‖32 emphasizing that police practice could go beyond mere 
 
 27. The Court has observed that litigation can be expressive, and even non-expressive 
litigation is protected under the First Amendment‘s Petition Clause. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. 
v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) (―The right of access to courts is indeed 
but one aspect of the right of petition.‖); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963) 
(holding that litigation aimed at ―achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treatment‖ is 
―political expression‖ protected by the First Amendment); see also infra Part I.B.2. 
 28. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 29. E.g., THE MIRANDA DEBATE:  LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING (Richard Leo & George 
C. Thomas III eds., 1998) (compiling essays regarding history, constitutionality, policy, and 
ethics of Miranda warning); Ainsworth, supra note 13; Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. 
Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles:  The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 
857, 858 (1995) (arguing that ―the government should be allowed to require a suspect to 
answer relevant questions in a civilized pretrial hearing presided over by a judge or 
magistrate,‖ after which ―compelled pretrial statements can never be introduced against him 
in a criminal case but that reliable fruits of such statements virtually always can be‖); 
Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?:  A Proposal to Mirandize 
Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1842 (1987) (arguing that ―[a]ll suspects in custody 
should have a nonwaivable right to consult with a lawyer before being interrogated by the 
police‖); Strauss, supra note 20. 
 30. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445. 
 31. Id. at 469. 
 32. Id. at 449–50 (describing a police training manual that directs police to interrogate 
suspects outside of their own homes, because a suspect at home ―is more keenly aware of his 
rights and more reluctant to tell of his indiscretions of criminal behavior within the walls of 
his home‖). 
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encouragement to ―persua[sion], trick[ery], and cajol[ing].‖33  The Court‘s 
concern was that psychologically coercive interrogation practices involving 
an ―unfamiliar atmosphere‖ and ―menacing police interrogation 
procedures‖ would undermine suspects‘ abilities to stand on their 
constitutional rights, rendering their subsequent statements not ―truly the 
product of free choice.‖34  Further, these conditions made it unlikely that 
suspects would be able to effectively request counsel, creating a vicious 
cycle in which coerced suspects would be kept both ignorant of their rights 
and deterred from learning about them.35 
The Court elaborated on this reasoning in subsequent cases.  In Berkemer 
v. McCarty,36 the Court considered whether the Miranda warning was 
required either when a motorist was stopped by the side of the road for a 
suspected traffic offense, or later when the same suspect was arrested for a 
relatively minor traffic offense and taken to the police station.37  Beginning 
with the second question, the Court held that the Miranda warning is 
required any time a suspect is taken into custody, even when the triggering 
offense is a misdemeanor.38  Again, the Court stressed the difficulty of 
invoking one‘s rights against self-incrimination in the face of police tactics, 
as well as the usefulness of a bright-line rule.39 
More telling was the Berkemer Court‘s holding regarding the need (or 
lack thereof) for a Miranda warning during a traffic stop.  As the Court put 
it, the question was ―whether a traffic stop exerts upon a detained person 
pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against 
self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional 
rights.‖40  Answering that question in the negative, the Court focused on 
two bases for distinguishing a traffic stop from custodial interrogation:  that 
the traffic stop is brief and that it is public.41  The presumptive brevity of a 
traffic stop meant that motorists likely would be aware that they would have 
 
 33. Id. at 455. 
 34. Id. at 457. 
 35. Id. at 465–66 (describing how police denial of a suspect‘s request for counsel 
―heightened [the suspect‘s] dilemma, and made his later statements the product of this 
compulsion‖). 
 36. 468 U.S. 420 (1984). 
 37. Id. at 422–23. 
 38. Id. at 433. 
 39. Id. at 432–33.  Some scholars have also emphasized the usefulness of a bright-line 
rule to distinguish voluntary from involuntary statements to police, sometimes suggesting 
that the Court could improve on Miranda in ways that further eliminate the need for hearings 
regarding issues related to Miranda warnings. E.g., Ogletree, supra note 29.  Others have 
argued that Miranda‘s bright-line rule can actually be counterproductive when judges are 
lulled ―into admitting confessions with little inquiry into voluntariness.‖ Richard A. Leo, 
Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1000, 
1026 (2001); see also Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 
745–46 (1992) (observing that in the twenty-five years following Miranda, ―the Court has 
reversed only two convictions on the ground that post-Miranda custodial interrogation 
produced an involuntary statement,‖ in contrast to twenty-three reversals pre-Miranda, and 
further, ―lower courts have adopted an attitude toward voluntariness claims that can only be 
called cavalier‖). 
 40. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437. 
 41. Id. at 437–38. 
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to withstand police questioning for only a short time before being allowed 
to continue on their way.42  The public nature of the stop meant that police 
officers would have fewer opportunities for ―illegitimate means to elicit 
self-incriminating statements . . . diminish[ing] the motorist‘s fear that, if he 
does not cooperate, he will be subjected to abuse.‖43  In combination, these 
factors meant that those stopped by the police would not be coerced into 
waiving their constitutional rights. 
For similar reasons, the Court has held that the Miranda warning need 
not be given before a suspect is interrogated by an undercover officer or 
police informant.44  In that situation, the suspect is unaware that ―the 
listeners have official power over him.‖45  This combination negates the 
―interplay between police interrogation and police custody‖ with which the 
Miranda court was concerned.46  In other words, suspects in these 
circumstances who wish to remain silent should be able to do so without the 
benefit of a warning.  Likewise, the Court has held that police need not 
inform suspects that their attorneys are trying to reach them, reasoning that 
―[e]vents occurring outside of the presence of the suspect and entirely 
unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend 
and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right.‖47 
These cases reveal that the Court‘s concern in developing the Miranda 
warning was not simply that criminal defendants may be unaware of their 
Fifth Amendment rights.48  Rather, the Court has been concerned only 
about situations in which even criminal suspects with baseline knowledge 
of their rights would be unable to invoke because of anticipated or actual 
police coercion.  This explains why the same suspect in Berkemer was 
entitled to a warning once he was arrested, but not when he was stopped by 
the side of the road—even though he was equally likely to be aware (or not) 
of his rights at both times.  Thus, the meta rights regime announced in 
Miranda is aimed at alleviating specific state-created conditions that 
discourage rights invocation. 
2.   Procedural Due Process and Notice Rights in Aggregate Litigation 
Procedural due process rights occupy an ambiguous position in the 
rights/meta rights framework.  At minimum, they are often quite similar to 
meta rights in that they demand that individuals receive notice and other 
protections before they are deprived of liberty or property interests.49  Yet, 
 
 42. Id. at 437. 
 43. Id. at 438. 
 44. See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 299–300 (1990). 
 45. Id. at 297. 
 46. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Yale Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and 
Miranda: What Is “Interrogation”?  When Does It Matter?, 67 GEO. L.J. 1, 63 (1978)). 
 47. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422 (1986). 
 48. See Yale Kamisar, Miranda Thirty-Five Years Later:  A Close Look at the Majority 
and Dissenting Opinions in Dickerson, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 387, 403 (2001) (―Miranda has 
been criticized from the outset for failing to recognize ‗the improbability, if not the 
impossibility, of an intelligent waiver‘ of one‘s Miranda rights.‖). 
 49. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). 
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procedural due process rights most often attach to liberty or property 
interests that are created by statute,50 rather than to substantive rights that 
flow from the Due Process Clause itself.  Thus, procedural due process 
rights are often separate from the underlying interests that they protect—
though there are some exceptions, including in the class action context51—
whereas meta rights are grounded in the same sources as the underlying 
rights that they protect.52  However, even when procedural due process 
rights are not meta rights as I have defined them, they may still provide 
useful insights about when and why courts require that rights-holders 
receive notice and process protections. 
In Mathews v. Eldridge,53 the Court announced the modern framework 
for determining when procedural due process protections, including the 
right to notice and a hearing, attach to government decisions depriving 
individuals of liberty or property interests.  Under the Mathews test, courts 
are to weigh 
first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and [the] probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government‘s interest, 
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens 
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.54 
 
 50. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (―Property 
interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution.  Rather they are created and their 
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent 
source such as state law.‖); see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 256, 264 (1970) 
(holding that procedural due process requires a hearing before discontinuance of statutorily 
created welfare benefits). 
 51. See infra notes 67, 69 and accompanying text.  I focus in particular on the class 
action context because of its analytical similarities to meta rights that arise in the First 
Amendment context.  However, other procedural due process rights—those that attach to 
substantive due process rights—may also qualify as meta rights. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 
401 U.S. 371, 382 (1970) (finding procedural due process right for indigent divorce 
petitioners to be excused from filing fee requirement).  However, the Court is often 
imprecise about the relationship between substantive and procedural due process rights, 
leaving some ambiguity as to where meta rights exist—a topic to be explored in future work. 
 52. In other words, procedural due process does not require that any particular liberty or 
property interest be created; it simply imposes an external constraint on government actors 
who choose to create such an interest. See generally Mathews, 424 U.S. 319.  In contrast, the 
Court derived the notice requirements announced in Miranda and the compelled speech 
cases, discussed in Part I.C–D, by interpreting and applying the Fifth and First Amendments, 
respectively; similarly, the due process right to opt out of certain class actions, discussed in 
this part, itself requires that class members receive notification of their rights.  Likewise, 
meta rights in statutory contexts are generally created either in the same statutes that create 
the underlying rights (as in the case of Title VII), or else they are created by administrative 
agencies charged with executing the underlying statute (as in the case of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act).  Accordingly, meta rights are not coextensive with procedural rights; instead 
only those notice and structural rights that are bundled with the rights they are intended to 
protect qualify as meta rights. 
 53. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 54. Id. at 335. 
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Courts have applied the Mathews tests to a range of situations with varying 
and often unpredictable results, leading to a significant body of criticism.55  
For example, while public employees often have property interests in their 
jobs, the Court has adopted a case-by-case approach to determining how 
much process is due, sometimes requiring an informal hearing before an 
employee is fired, but other times allowing public employers to act first, 
and provide process later.56 
Though the process required by procedural due process varies, it often 
consists of a pre-deprivation, nonjudicial hearing, which must be preceded 
by adequate notice.57  It goes nearly without saying that the purpose of the 
administrative hearing is to avoid erroneous deprivations, though others 
have pointed out that hearings may have other benefits as well.58  The 
reason for the accompanying notice right is similarly straightforward:  
―Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order 
that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.‖59  In other words, 
the required notice provides factual information so that the hearing recipient 
can participate meaningfully.60  In contrast, the Court has held that due 
process does not require notice of legal rights, which are ―generally 
 
 55. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial 
Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 330–31 (1993) (describing 
limits to Mathews test); Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication:  An 
Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUDIES 307, 373–75 (1994) (describing scholarly criticism 
of Mathews and arguing the Mathews test is ―confused‖); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme 
Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge:  
Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 46–57 (1976) (arguing 
Mathews is overly utilitarian); Jason Parkin, Adaptable Due Process, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 
1309, 1326–34 (2012) (describing criticism of Mathews); Richard B. Saphire, Specifying 
Due Process Values:  Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 
U. PA. L. REV. 111, 154–56 (1978) (arguing Mathews undervalues dignitary interests); Eric 
K. Yamamoto, Efficiency’s Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for Minorities, 25 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 341, 354–55 (1990) (arguing Mathews can be criticized as overly 
utilitarian). 
 56. Compare Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543 (1985) (public 
employee entitled to pre-termination informal hearing), with Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 
935 (1997) (police officer not entitled to pre-suspension hearing after arrest on drug 
charges), and Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 898 
(1961) (public employee not entitled to notice or opportunity to be heard before security 
badge was revoked, resulting in termination of employment). See also J. Michael 
McGuinness, Procedural Due Process Rights of Public Employees:  Basic Rules and a 
Rationale for a Return to Rule-Oriented Process, 33 NEW ENG. L. REV. 931, 935 (1999) 
(observing that ―the Supreme Court has declined to specify any litmus test as to what 
procedural safeguards must be afforded to public employees prior to or after adverse 
employment action‖). 
 57. See Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1270–71 
(1975) (describing development of the hearing requirement). 
 58. See, e.g., Parkin, supra note 55, at 1327–29 (describing benefits to pre-termination 
benefits hearings, such as improving government accountability, allowing welfare recipients 
to interact with government on a more equal footing, and promoting organizing). 
 59. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 
67, 80 (1972). 
 60. Friendly, supra note 57 at 1280–81 (citations omitted) (―It is likewise fundamental 
that notice be given and that it be timely and clearly inform the individual of the proposed 
action and the grounds for it.  Otherwise the individual likely would be unable to marshal 
evidence and prepare his case so as to benefit from any hearing that was provided.‖). 
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available [through] state statutes and case law.‖61  Thus, whereas a 
municipality that seizes private property must provide notice that the 
seizure has occurred—―because the property owner would have no other 
reasonable means of ascertaining who was responsible for his loss‖—the 
municipality need not give notice of available remedies because that 
information is publicly available from other sources.62  The significance of 
this distinction between ignorance of facts and ignorance of law is 
discussed in Part II. 
As described above, procedural due process rights sometimes do qualify 
as meta rights because they were developed to protect rights that themselves 
arise under the Due Process Clause.  One significant example arises in the 
class action context,63 where many unnamed or ―absent‖ class members 
have a due process right to litigate individually.64  This due process right is 
in turn buttressed by a meta right:  a due process right to notice of the 
opportunity to opt out. 
The parameters of the right to litigate individually and the meta right to 
notice are established by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.65  However, 
Rule 23 carefully tracks the Due Process analysis, and both apply only to 
class actions that seek money damages,66 where absent class members are 
entitled to an opportunity to litigate individually and notice of the same.67  
That rule, as well as its constitutional grounding, flows from Mullane v. 
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,68 in which the Court held that absent 
claimants had a due process right to ―reasonably certain‖ notice of the 
impending resolution of their case, which involved payouts from a common 
trust fund.69  The Court stressed that the notice was linked to the due 
process ―right to be heard,‖ which ―has little reality or worth unless one is 
informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to 
appear or default, acquiesce or contest.‖70 
 
 61. City of W. Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 241 (1999). 
 62. Id. 
 63. For ease of reference, I generally use the term ―class actions‖ to refer to all forms of 
aggregate litigation accompanied by opt-out rights. 
 64. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).  Mullane was 
not itself a Rule 23 class action, but rather a proceeding to settle numerous potential claims 
against a trust. Id. at 307. 
 65. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 66.  Id. 23(b); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2559 (2011) 
(explaining that lack of notice or opportunity to opt out of class action violates due process 
when the class action seeks money damages); Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313 (reasoning that 
absent class members are bound by the judgment or settlement in a class action, meaning 
that the class action extinguishes each absent class member‘s claim, which is a potentially 
valuable asset). 
 67. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).  For class actions in which only declaratory or injunctive 
relief is sought—class actions certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1) or 
(b)(2)—notice may be issued but is not required. 
 68. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
 69. Id. at 315; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee‘s note of 1966 (―This 
mandatory notice pursuant to subdivision (c)(2) . . . is designed to fulfill requirements of due 
process to which the class action procedure is of course subject.‖). 
 70. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. 
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Similarly, the Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts71 Court stressed that 
absent class members with ―claims averaging about $100 per plaintiff‖ were 
entitled to notice of their right to opt out of the class and litigate 
individually, even though individuals with small claims are very unlikely to 
exercise that right.72  However, the Court also carefully structured the meta 
rights to align with the practicalities of the case, rejecting the defendant‘s 
argument that an opt-in default (a structural meta right) was required to 
fully protect absent class members‘ due process rights to litigate 
individually: 
Requiring a plaintiff to affirmatively request inclusion would probably 
impede the prosecution of those class actions involving an aggregation of 
small individual claims, where a large number of claims are required to 
make it economical to bring suit.  The plaintiff‘s claim may be so small, 
or the plaintiff so unfamiliar with the law, that he would not file suit 
individually, nor would he affirmatively request inclusion in the class if 
such a request were required by the Constitution. If, on the other hand, the 
plaintiff‘s claim is sufficiently large or important that he wishes to litigate 
it on his own, he will likely have retained an attorney or have thought 
about filing suit, and should be fully capable of exercising his right to 
―opt out.‖73 
Thus, the Shutts Court determined that an opt-out default was appropriate 
by considering the likely preferences and interests of different kinds of class 
members, assuming they would act in a manner consistent with their 
economic interests.74  However, the Court did not suggest that the opt-out 
default was constitutionally required, and it explicitly rejected the opposite 
argument, that an opt-in was constitutionally required.75  Instead, the Court 
simply chose what it viewed as the best default, which presumably could 
have been legislatively overridden.76  Put another way, the Court 
understood that some absent class members who had not opted out had 
failed to make a choice and simply waived their rights because of inertia.77  
The Court nonetheless concluded that this was a constitutionally acceptable 
state of affairs and, in any event, best served the likely interests of the 
majority of absent class members.78  Conversely, the Court assumed that 
 
 71. 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
 72. Id. at 809. 
 73. Id. at 812–13 (citations omitted).  Some commentators have criticized this rule as 
failing to adequately protect the constitutional rights of litigants. See Martin H. Redish & 
Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the Foundations of Procedural 
Due Process, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1601 (2007) (arguing that class actions implicate First 
Amendment rights against compelled expression or association). 
 74. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812–13. 
 75. Id. at 812. 
 76. Id. at 813–14 (stating that adopting an ―opt in‖ requirement as a matter of 
constitutional law would ―require the invalidation of scores of state statutes as well as 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65‖). 
 77. Id. at 812–13. 
 78. Although this Article focuses only on the meta rights associated with class actions, 
other procedural protections are also in place.  For example, judges must assure themselves 
that the class definition is appropriate and must approve any settlement. FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(a), (e). 
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the absent class members who had the strongest motivation to exercise their 
rights—those with large claims who might conclude that they would do 
better individually than as part of a class—would take the necessary steps to 
opt out and concluded that there was no constitutional barrier to requiring 
them to take those steps.79 
Finally, it is worth briefly considering the absence of both rights and 
meta rights in class actions seeking only equitable relief.  In these cases, 
absent class members are neither entitled to opt out of the class nor even 
guaranteed notice of the pendency of the class action, except in cases in 
which the parties propose settlement.80  The Court has justified this 
different treatment by reasoning that in class actions seeking monetary 
judgments, class members may be better off litigating individually based on 
their unique circumstances, whereas injunctive and declaratory relief is 
more likely to be one-size-fits-all.81  Ironically, though, equitable class 
actions are relatively likely to deal with politically charged topics about 
which class members may hold different views.82  These are the class 
actions that are most likely to qualify as ―expressive,‖ implicating First 
Amendment rights of free speech and association in addition to petition.83  
Thus, the Court‘s conclusion that absent class members are entitled to 
notice only in monetary relief cases means that absent class members are 
not guaranteed even the ability to attempt to influence the course of the 
litigation, much less an opportunity to avoid association with a class of 
 
 79. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 813 (―[T]he Constitution does not require more to protect what 
must be the somewhat rare species of class member who is unwilling to execute an ‗opt out‘ 
form, but whose claim is nonetheless so important that he cannot be presumed to consent to 
being a member of the class by his failure to do so.‖). 
 80. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1); Mark C. Weber, Preclusion and Procedural Due 
Process in Rule 23(b)(2) Class Actions, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 347, 347–48 (1987). 
 81. Compare Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2559 (2011) (explaining 
that lack of notice or opportunity to opt out of class action violates due process when the 
class action seeks money damages), with Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 
U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (reasoning that absent class members are bound by the judgment or 
settlement in a class action, meaning that the class action extinguishes each absent class 
member‘s claim, which is a potentially valuable asset). 
 82. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters:  Integration Ideals and Client 
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 505–06 (1976) (―[T]he 
strongest opposition to civil rights litigation strategy may come from unnamed class 
members.‖); see also Weber, supra note 80, at 353 (―Antipoverty and civil rights cases 
continue to be among the most frequently filed [equitable relief] class actions.‖). 
 83. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963) (stating that class-based civil rights 
litigation is an ―effective form of political association‖).  Thus, some scholars have argued 
that class membership implicates—and potentially infringes—First Amendment rights. 
Redish & Larsen, supra note 73, at 1601 (―[I]n certain instances, forced association with 
those who seek to pursue courses of action that the litigant finds economically, morally or 
politically offensive also threatens fundamental First Amendment dictates that can similarly 
be discerned from the values appropriately found to explain the procedural due process 
guarantee.‖); Jay Tidmarsh, Superiority As Unity, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 565, 575 (2013) (―[I]f 
the First Amendment‘s freedoms of expression and association guarantee a right of 
nonassociation, then how can the government force class members to associate with each 
other in a class action?‖ (citation omitted)). 
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litigants seeking a potentially offensive remedy.84  This state of affairs also 
contrasts significantly with some of the Court‘s holdings in the compelled 
speech and subsidization context, to which the next section is devoted. 
C.   Rights and Meta Rights Not to Subsidize Speech 
This section traces the scope of objectors‘ rights not to speak or subsidize 
others‘ speech.  As other scholars have shown, the Court‘s analysis of these 
rights lacks a coherent theoretical justification.85  This critique is equally 
applicable to the Court‘s compelled speech meta rights jurisprudence.86  
This section begins with cases concerning the right not to subsidize speech 
financially, where meta rights are prevalent.  In contrast, meta rights to 
avoid compelled speech itself are conspicuous only in their absence. 
1.   Labor Unions 
Unionized American workplaces are generally governed by the 
―exclusive representation‖ system, in which an elected union represents all 
of the employees in a bargaining unit, including those who voted in favor of 
representation by a different union or against unionization altogether.87  
This means that each bargaining unit member is covered by the same 
 
 84. Redish & Larsen, supra note 73, at 1601–02 (discussing range of objections to class 
action litigation in general and to specific suits). 
 85. E.g., Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association 
Rights After Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023, 1025 (2013) (arguing 
that the Court‘s compelled subsidization doctrine regarding unions cannot be reconciled with 
First Amendment doctrine privileging the rights of organizations over the rights of 
associated individuals); Gregory Klass, The Very Idea of a First Amendment Right Against 
Compelled Subsidization, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1087, 1090 (2005) (―Over the years, 
however, the Court has employed different standards to decide compelled subsidization 
cases.  And it has never settled on a single account of the doctrine‘s theoretical 
underpinnings—just what First Amendment interest is threatened by compelled 
subsidization.‖); Robert Post, Compelled Subsidization of Speech:  Johanns v. Livestock 
Marketing Association, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 195, 197–98 (arguing that ―the fundamental 
premise of [compelled subsidization doctrine] is flawed‖ and that the doctrine ―cannot be 
rebuilt along theoretically defensible lines until we have some better explanation of when 
First Amendment review should be triggered and when it should not‖). 
 86. Because this Article is focused on meta rights, I discuss only those compelled speech 
cases that involve an institutional speaker that seeks to compel affiliated individuals to speak 
or subsidize institutional speech.  This is because such cases are the only ones in which meta 
rights are feasible; where it is difficult or impossible to tell in advance who might be affected 
by a compulsion to speak, it would also be extremely challenging to provide advance notice 
of the right to avoid compelled speech. 
 87. Clyde W. Summers, Exclusive Representation:  A Comparative Inquiry into a 
“Unique” American Principle, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL‘Y J. 47, 47 (1998) (stating that 
―[t]he fundamental ordering principle which shapes American labor law and collective 
bargaining is the principle of exclusive representation articulated in Section 9(a) of the 
National Labor Relations Act.‖); Deborah A. Schmedemann, Of Meetings and Mailboxes:  
The First Amendment and Exclusive Representation in Public Sector Labor Relations, 72 
VA. L. REV. 91, 92 (1986) (―Public sector labor laws generally follow the private sector 
doctrines of majority rule and exclusive representation.‖). 
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collective bargaining agreement, which is negotiated and enforced by the 
union.88 
Bargaining, contract administration, and other union activities are costly, 
raising a question about how union expenses will be shared among 
bargaining unit members.  In twenty-four ―right to work‖ states, the answer 
to this question is straightforward because state legislatures have barred 
unions from charging unwilling bargaining unit members for any of the 
costs of representation.89  However, in the remaining ―fair share‖ states, the 
answer is more complicated.  As explained in more detail below, unions 
and employers may agree that each bargaining unit member must pay part, 
but not all, of the union‘s costs.  Specifically, bargaining unit members can 
be required to pay only for those costs that are germane to the process of 
collective bargaining, but not for other costs, such as those associated with 
lobbying and political advocacy.90  The chargeable portion is called an 
agency fee.91 
In the public sector, as well as in workplaces governed by the Railway 
Labor Act,92 this arrangement raises First Amendment questions regarding 
compelled subsidization of union speech.  In a series of cases concerning 
unionized railway and public sector workplaces,93 the Court established the 
scope of government employees‘ First Amendment rights not to associate 
with or fund labor unions.  Additionally, the Court has created an evolving 
and detailed set of meta rights designed to facilitate bargaining unit 
members‘ exercise of their rights not to pay for non-germane union activity. 
The key modern case establishing the parameters of public sector 
bargaining unit members‘ rights to refrain from paying for certain union 
 
 88. Conversely, the union owes all bargaining unit members a duty of fair 
representation. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 271 (2009) (discussing the 
duty that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) imposes on a union to serve all 
bargaining unit members without acting arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith). 
 89. See Right to Work States, NAT‘L RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEF. FOUND., INC., 
http://www.nrtw.org/rtws.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2014) (listing state right to work laws). 
 90. See Matthew T. Bodie, Labor Speech, Corporate Speech, and Political Speech:  
Response to Professor Sachs, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 206, 208 (2012). 
 91. Gerald D. Wixted, Agency Shops & the First Amendment:  A Balancing Test in Need 
of Unweighted Scales, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 833, 833 (1987). 
 92. Though employers and unions governed by the Railway Labor Act (RLA) are 
private, the Court nonetheless held that union shop contracts governed by the RLA satisfy 
the First Amendment‘s state action requirement because the RLA preempts state right to 
work laws. Ry. Emp. Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 (1956) (citing 45 U.S.C. § 152 
(1951)). 
 93. In Communications Workers of America v. Beck, the Court extended the framework 
applicable to public sector and railway unions to private sector unions governed by the 
NLRA as a matter of statutory construction. 487 U.S. 735, 762–63 (1988).  Thus, the Beck 
Court did not decide whether the conduct of private sector, NLRA-governed, unions 
involves state action. Id. at 761.  I do not address that question in this Article, though others 
and I have critiqued it elsewhere. Charlotte Garden, Citizens, United and Citizens United:  
The Future of Labor Speech Rights?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 41–42 (2011) (arguing that 
state action is not present in NLRA context); Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and 
Political Opt-Out Rights After Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800, 848–50 (2012) 
(critiquing the argument that state action is present in NLRA or RLA context).  Thus, though 
the same meta rights generally apply whether the employer is in the public or private sector, 
I generally confine this Article to the public sector for ease of discussion. 
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expenses, particularly union political spending, is Abood v. Detroit Board of 
Education.94  Abood held that while any obligation to support a union could 
―interfere in some way with an employee‘s freedom to associate,‖95 
employees could nonetheless be required to pay for union expenses that are 
germane to collective bargaining.96  Conversely, these employees could not 
be required to fund union ―expression of political views,‖ support for 
political candidates, or ―other ideological causes not germane‖ to collective 
bargaining.97 
The Court arrived at this formula by balancing objectors‘ First 
Amendment rights to avoid unwanted speech and association against the 
countervailing government interest in the stability achieved through the 
exclusive representation system.98  The Court did not weigh the First 
Amendment rights of unions or willing speakers in this calculus.99  The 
Court emphasized the strength of the objectors‘ interest in avoiding 
compelled subsidization of speech with which they disagreed, quoting 
Thomas Jefferson:  ―to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for 
the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and 
tyrannical.‖100  Yet, the Court continued, the government had an important 
interest in the exclusive representation system because that system 
prevents inter-union rivalries from creating dissension within the work 
force and eliminating the advantages to the employee of collectivization.  
It also frees the employer from the possibility of facing conflicting 
demands from different unions, and permits the employer and a single 
union to reach agreements and settlements that are not subject to attack 
from rival labor organizations.101 
Further, permitting bargaining unit members to free ride by receiving the 
benefits of union representation without paying for them would threaten the 
―labor peace‖-related benefits of exclusive representation, in that it could 
deprive the union of resources necessary to effectively represent members, 
which in turn could lead to a greater possibility of labor unrest.102 
Thus, public employers and unions may agree that bargaining unit 
members are required, on pain of job loss, to pay an ―agency fee‖ 
representing their share of union activities that are germane to the union‘s 
 
 94. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).  The Court recently held in Harris v. Quinn that Abood did not 
apply in the context of so-called partial-public employees, although Harris did not modify 
Abood‘s core holding. 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2638 (2014). 
 95. Abood, 431 U.S. at 222. 
 96. Id. at 235–36. 
 97. Id. at 235. 
 98. Id. at 220–21 (explaining that exclusive representation means that an elected union is 
responsible for fairly representing all of the employees in a bargaining unit, to the exclusion 
of all other bargaining representatives). 
 99. I have critiqued this failure elsewhere. See Garden, supra note 93, at 40–41 (arguing 
that Citizens United requires courts to weigh union First Amendment rights against objector 
First Amendment rights). 
 100. Abood, 431 U.S. at 234–35 n.31 (quoting I. BRANT, JAMES MADISON: THE 
NATIONALIST 354 (1948)). 
 101. Id. at 220–21. 
 102. Id. at 224, 221–22. 
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role as workplace representative of bargaining unit employees, particularly 
collective bargaining and grievance administration.103  Later cases, 
including Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n,104 defined the scope of 
―germane‖ expenses in greater detail.105  In Lehnert, the union charged 
represented employees who did not join the union the full amount of union 
dues, reasoning that all of its activities, including political interventions 
such as lobbying on issues related to the workplace, were ultimately 
designed to improve the union‘s collective bargaining position.106  The 
Court rejected this position in significant part, holding that, whereas unions 
could require public employees to fund bargaining and grievance 
administration, union conventions and other social activities, and strike 
preparation, they could not charge objecting bargaining unit members for 
lobbying and other political activity—except to the extent the lobbying was 
designed to encourage a legislature to approve a collective bargaining 
agreement—or for new organizing and the conduct of illegal strikes.107 
In sum, employees who are part of a union-represented bargaining unit 
cannot be required to become full dues-paying members of the union, but 
they may be required to pay an agency fee.  In turn, unions may use agency 
fees to fund only those activities that are germane to collective bargaining. 
Conversely, employees cannot be required to fund non-germane activities, 
including ideological activities like lobbying and political campaigning.108  
Thus, union-represented public employees in fair-share jurisdictions 
generally fall into one of three categories:  union members who pay the full 
amount of union dues (―members‖); nonmembers who nonetheless pay the 
equivalent of full union dues (―full freight‖ payers); and nonmembers who 
pay the agency fee and who may prefer to pay not even that much 
(―dissenters‖ or ―objectors‖).  In addition, a smaller number of bargaining 
unit members come to an alternate arrangement with their union.  For 
example, represented employees whose religious beliefs are incompatible 
with payment of any money to support a union often have a statutory right 
to seek an accommodation from their union, such as the chance to pay the 
equivalent of union dues or the agency fee to a charity.109 
 
 103. The Abood Court recognized that many aspects of germane union activity in the 
public sector implicated employees‘ First Amendment rights. Id. at 222.  However, those 
rights were overcome by the government interest in labor peace, as promoted by the 
exclusive representation system. Id. at 222–23. 
 104. 500 U.S. 507 (1991) (plurality opinion). 
 105. Id. at 522; see also Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 448–53 
(1984) (holding that unions‘ relevant expenses include costs of conventions, social activities, 
publication of information about germane union activities, and certain litigation, but exclude 
new organizing). 
 106. See Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 512–13; Brief for Respondents, Lehnert, 500 U.S. 507 (No. 
89-1217), 1990 WL 505709, at *28–40 (arguing that lobbying on issues such as pension 
reform, education funding, length of school day, and funding for public employees was 
germane to collective bargaining on behalf of public school teachers). 
 107. See Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 520–32. 
 108. Id. at 520. 
 109. See Reed v. Int‘l Union, United Auto., Aerospace, & Agric. Implement Workers of 
Am., 569 F.3d 576, 579 (6th Cir. 2009) (describing Title VII‘s protections for religious 
bargaining unit members, which include the right to a reasonable accommodation); Katter v. 
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Abood left open several questions about how dissenters would exercise 
their First Amendment rights against compelled subsidization.  Would there 
be a default position in which bargaining unit members covered by an 
agency fee agreement could pay full freight and opt out of paying for the 
union‘s non-germane speech, or would the default be to pay just the agency 
fee?  Will members be notified of their rights not to pay, and if so, how, 
when, and by whom?  Through what procedural mechanism will members 
exercise their rights not to pay?  What recourse will be available to 
members who are dissatisfied with the calculation of the agency fee?  The 
Court later answered these questions about meta rights in a series of cases, 
of which Knox v. Service Employees International Union Local 1000110 is 
the most recent. 
To begin, the Court rejected a ―pure rebate approach,‖ reasoning that 
―[g]iven the existence of acceptable alternatives, the union cannot be 
allowed to commit dissenters‘ funds to improper uses even temporarily.‖111  
Accordingly, unions wanting to charge dissenters an agency fee had to 
develop a procedure to determine in advance the percentage of dues they 
would likely spend on non-chargeable expenses, and deduct that amount in 
advance from the fees to be paid by objectors.112  The Court evaluated one 
such procedure in Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson,113 answering many 
of the questions that remained following Abood.114 
The objectors in Hudson were bargaining unit members who deemed 
inadequate the union‘s procedure for allowing objectors to exercise their 
Abood rights.115  Under that procedure, the union first assessed the 
―proportionate share‖ of union dues that were to be devoted to chargeable 
activities, and began automatically deducting that amount from objectors‘ 
paychecks.116  Objectors seeking to challenge the union‘s calculation then 
had to write to the union president within thirty days of the first 
deduction.117  That letter triggered a three-step appeal procedure that 
culminated with arbitration; ―[i]f an objection was sustained at any stage of 
the procedure, the remedy would be an immediate reduction in the amount 
of future deductions for all nonmembers and a rebate for the objector.‖118 
The Hudson objectors successfully challenged this procedure as 
inadequate to protect their First Amendment rights to avoid compelled 
 
Ohio Emp‘t Relations Bd., 492 F. Supp. 2d 851, 864 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (holding that a public 
sector employee was entitled to religious accommodation under either Ohio law or Title VII 
of the federal Civil Rights Act). 
 110. 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012). 
 111. Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435,  443–44 (1984).  In a ―pure 
rebate approach,‖ the union charges objectors the full freight amount but then periodically 
refunds to objectors the fraction of total dues payments spent on non-chargeable expenses 
during the previous period. Id. at 443–44. 
 112. Id. 
 113. 475 U.S. 292 (1986). 
 114. Id. at 305–06. 
 115. Id. at 294. 
 116. Id. at 295. 
 117. Id. at 296. 
 118. Id. 
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support of non-chargeable union activities, including the right to avoid 
payment followed by a rebate.119  In addition to offering an explanation—
albeit a brief one—for imposing procedural safeguards at all,120 the Court 
adopted a trio of notice and structural meta rights to protect dissenters,121  
concluding that the First Amendment required them to do so—creating a 
true meta right. 
The Hudson safeguards are as follows.  First, unions must annually notify 
bargaining unit members of their opt-out rights via a document now called a 
Hudson notice.122  This notice must include ―sufficient information to 
gauge the propriety of the union‘s fee,‖ which is calculated based on the 
union‘s spending during the previous year.123  In addition, unions must 
provide ―a reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the 
fee before an impartial decisionmaker,‖ and hold any amount of the 
objector‘s fee that is ―reasonably in dispute‖ in escrow while the challenge 
is pending.124  The Court explained that these procedures were designed to 
prevent unions from even temporarily using dissenters‘ money for non-
chargeable ideological expenses.125  Finally, the Court did not revise its 
earlier conclusion that the opt-out default (meaning that nonmembers pay 
full freight unless they affirmatively indicate their willingness to do so) was 
adequate; the Court reiterated that ―dissent is not to be presumed—it must 
affirmatively be made known to the union by the dissenting employee.‖126 
In two subsequent cases, the Court held that these procedures are only a 
floor, and that states are free to take other steps to protect or even encourage 
workers not to pay full freight.  First, in Davenport v. Washington 
Education Ass’n,127 the Court upheld the Washington State‘s opt-in 
statutory regime, under which labor unions were prohibited ―from using the 
agency-shop fees of a nonmember for election-related purposes unless the 
nonmember affirmatively consents.‖128  The Court reasoned that Hudson 
was merely a floor below which protections for objectors could not fall, and 
further, although ―courts have an obligation to interfere with a union‘s 
statutory entitlement no more than is necessary to vindicate the rights of 
nonmembers,‖ ―legislatures (or voters) themselves‖ could do more to 
protect nonmembers.129  In other words, because state legislatures may 
refuse to allow public sector bargaining at all, or they may allow bargaining 
 
 119. Id. at 303–04. 
 120. This reasoning is analyzed in Part II. 
 121. Hudson, 475 U.S. at 310. 
 122. Id. at 306; Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int‘l Union Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2291–92 
(2012) (describing annual Hudson notice procedure). 
 123. Hudson, 475 U.S. at 406. 
 124. Id. at 309–10. 
 125. Id. at 305–06 (holding that the union could not make ―forced exaction followed by a 
rebate‖). 
 126. Id. at 306 n.16 (quoting Railway Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 119 (1963) 
(adopting opt-out default in Railway Labor Act context)); see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of 
Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 238 (1977) (relying on Allen in public sector context). 
 127. 551 U.S. 177 (2007). 
 128. Id. at 180. 
 129. Id. at 186. 
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but bar unions from collecting any fees from unwilling nonmembers, they 
may also take the lesser step of allowing agency fees, but making it more 
difficult for unions to collect them.130  Two years later, in Ysursa v. 
Pocatello Education Ass’n,131 the Court upheld an Idaho statute eliminating 
automatic payroll deduction (check off) of money intended to fund union 
political activities.132  The Court reasoned that the government was ―not 
required to assist others in funding the expression of particular ideas, 
including political ones,‖ and that check off qualified as government 
assistance.133 
These cases formed the applicable legal landscape until Knox called into 
question the continuing validity of much of the Hudson framework.  Knox 
arose following a California local union‘s decision to levy a midyear dues 
increase to establish a ―Political Fight Back Fund,‖ ostensibly to fight two 
antiunion public ballot initiatives.134  That name turned out to be both 
inaccurate and infelicitous—the union ultimately spent the extra money on 
representational activities rather than political campaigning, but the Court 
rejected the idea that a ―political fight-back-fund‖ could have in fact funded 
nonpolitical speech.135  In levying the increase, the union neither issued a 
supplemental Hudson notice nor allowed a new opportunity to opt out, 
though it did honor previous opt-outs.  In response, dissenting bargaining 
unit members sued, raising two issues:  a rights question about whether the 
union‘s lobbying was chargeable, and a meta rights question about whether 
the union was required to issue a new Hudson notice before imposing a 
midyear dues increase. 
The Knox Court primarily addressed the meta rights question, actually 
going further than the plaintiffs asked, and holding that the opt-out regime 
was not sufficiently protective of the First Amendment interests of 
dissenters.136  Instead, the Court held that an opt-in regime was required.137  
To reach this conclusion, the Court focused on bargaining unit members 
who had not joined the union, yet paid full freight—a combination that the 
Court viewed as explicable only in terms of a massive failure of Hudson‘s 
meta rights regime to protect dissenters.138  Significantly, in its discussion 
of these employees, the Court equated the opt-out default itself with 
 
 130. Id. at 184. 
 131. 555 U.S. 353 (2009). 
 132. Id. at 355–56. 
 133. Id. at 358. 
 134. Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int‘l Union Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2285 (2012). 
 135. Id. at 2293. 
 136. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 85, at 1043.  The Knox dissenters and scholars 
have criticized the Court‘s activist decision to go beyond the question presented and adopt an 
opt-in regime. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2297–98 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 2306 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting); Martin H. Malin, Does Public Employee Collective Bargaining Distort 
Democracy?  A Perspective from the United States, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL‘Y J. 277, 299 
(2013). 
 137. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2291. 
 138. The reliability of this conclusion is critiqued in Part II.C.2. 
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―acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.‖139  Thus, contrary to 
Abood (as well as cases like Shutts), which emphasized that the 
Constitution was not implicated by the fact that dissenters had to take action 
in order to opt out of a default, the Knox Court concluded not that full-
freight payers had slept on their rights, but instead that their rights had been 
violated.140  However, assuming one accepts this premise, funding political 
speech and declining to fund that speech are equally exercises of First 
Amendment rights141—meaning that the Court‘s equation is plausible only 
if it is correct that it is ―likely that most employees who choose not to join 
the union that represents their bargaining unit prefer not to pay the full 
amount of union dues.‖142  If instead the opposite is true, then Knox‘s 
premise that speech defaults or barriers themselves violate the First 
Amendment calls into question not just Knox itself but also Ysursa and 
Davenport. 
Finally, while Knox was limited to midyear dues increases, it is unclear 
why the Court‘s reasoning would not apply equally to any union dues 
assessment—the Court suggested no reason that the First Amendment rights 
of dissenters are heightened in the middle of the dues year.  Given this, one 
can expect to see objectors with an eye toward Supreme Court review to 
begin to invite courts to reconsider whether Hudson procedures are 
adequate to protect dissenters.143 
First Amendment rights to avoid compelled subsidization are more 
robustly developed in the union context than in any other context raising 
compelled speech or subsidization issues.  However, meta rights also exist 
in the context of bar associations and—more obliquely—compelled 
agricultural advertising schemes.  These contexts are discussed in the next 
two sections. 
2.   Bar Associations 
Whether attorneys have a First Amendment right to opt out of mandatory 
bar dues, either in whole or in part, is a question with close parallels to the 
union context.  Indeed, the Court‘s limited case law in this area (consisting 
of two cases, the second of which overturned the first) largely tracks Abood, 
 
 139. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2290 (quoting Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary 
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 682 (1999)). 
 140. Thus, the Court expressed concern for employees who lacked strong political views:  
―Nor did we [in previous cases] explore the extent of First Amendment protection for 
employees who might not qualify as active ‗dissenters‘ but who would nonetheless prefer to 
keep their own money rather than subsidizing by default the political agenda of a state-
favored union.‖ Id. at 2290. The Court appeared to understand these employees as having 
rationally decided that completing the Hudson process was not worth their time, considering 
the weakness of their preferences not to pay full freight.  Yet, the Court concluded that the 
First Amendment demanded protection for these employees too. Id. 
 141. Joseph Blocher, Rights to and Not to, 100 CAL. L. REV. 761, 795–97 (2012) (tracing 
the development of the First Amendment right not to speak). 
 142. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2290. 
 143. At least one such case is currently pending. Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass‘n, No. 
8:13-cv-00676-JLW-CW (C.D. Cal. 2013), available at http://www.cir-
usa.org/legal_docs/friedrichs_v_cta_dc_dec_pldg.pdf. 
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though the nuances of the law governing mandatory bar association dues 
are less developed.  The leading case is Keller v. State Bar of California,144 
in which the Court held that attorneys were entitled to a partial opt-out from 
California‘s integrated bar association.  As in Abood, the Court held that the 
state bar‘s functions were important enough to justify limited compelled 
association and, in turn, to compel objectors to pay for germane 
expenditures—here, those ―necessarily or reasonably incurred for the 
purpose of regulating the legal profession or improving the quality of the 
legal service available to the people of the State.‖145  However, the Court 
declined to reach the meta rights question of what procedures were required 
in order to protect objectors, citing the underdeveloped record on that 
issue.146 
Since Keller, only a handful of courts have addressed that question.  
They have generally held that Hudson‘s procedures are applicable in the bar 
dues context,147 though some courts read Hudson quite loosely.  For 
example, the Eleventh Circuit cited Hudson and upheld the Florida Bar‘s 
procedure for complying with Keller even though it differed in significant 
ways from the procedures required in Hudson.148  Specifically, the bar 
association required dissenters to object on an issue-by-issue basis, and then 
offered a rebate (with interest) of the dues spent on lobbying on particular 
issues149—essentially, the ―pure rebate‖ approach forbidden by Abood and 
Hudson.  Further, while the Florida Bar provided notice via a bar newsletter 
of the various political positions on which it lobbied, it did not issue 
individualized notice to each member on either of those issues or the 
member‘s right to object.150  Nonetheless, the Court held that the 
procedures were adequate, with the sole caveat that Florida was required to 
calculate interest on refunded dues based on the date that the Bar took the 
contested position, rather than the date it received notice of a member‘s 
objection.151  This conclusion stands in tension with Hudson, in which the 
Court rejected similar procedures.152 
Other state bar associations have procedures that plainly fall short of 
Hudson‘s strictures.153  However, few have been challenged in court.  One 
 
 144. 496 U.S. 1 (1990). 
 145. Id. at 14 (quoting Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 447 
(1984)).  In contrast, objectors could not be compelled to pay for the bar associations‘ 
activities that were unrelated to those goals, such as filing amicus briefs in cases presenting 
issues unrelated to the regulation of the legal profession. 
 146. Id. at 17. 
 147. E.g., Romero v. Colegio De Abogados De P.R., 204 F.3d 291, 304 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(rejecting rebate plus interest approach because that approach was inconsistent with 
Hudson). 
 148. Gibson v. Fla. Bar, 906 F.2d 624, 630 (11th Cir. 1990); see also The Florida Bar re 
Frankel, 581 So. 2d 1294, 1299 (Fla. 1991) (adopting the rationale in Gibson). 
 149. Gibson, 906 F.2d at 628–29. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 631–32. 
 152. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 153. For example, the District of Columbia bar rules list various membership classes and 
associated dues amounts with no mention of the possibility of objecting to a portion of bar 
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reason for this may be that bar associations‘ lobbying and other political 
interventions are less obvious than unions‘, sparking less ire from unwilling 
bar members.  Alternatively, it may be that attorneys who object to bar 
associations‘ political spending prefer to contend with relatively obscure 
procedures than to commence expensive litigation aimed at securing 
stronger meta rights for all.  Whatever the reason, though, opting out of bar 
associations‘ non-chargeable spending is often a more complicated 
proposition than taking the equivalent steps in the union context. 
3.   Generic Advertising 
The Court has addressed compelled subsidization of generic advertising 
schemes administered by private industry trade groups three times; the 
outcome in two of those cases turned on the scope of individual producers‘ 
rights to avoid compelled subsidization of speech.154  In each, an 
agricultural producer objected on First Amendment grounds to the 
compelled subsidization of advertising that did not refer to any particular 
producer, but instead simply touted the benefits of a product—asserting, for 
example, ―beef, it‘s what‘s for dinner.‖  Although the compelled subsidies 
in the cases were essentially identical from the advertisers‘ perspectives, the 
structure of the two programs resulted in two five-to-four decisions pointing 
in opposite directions.  Further, in each case, the majority asserted that it 
was correctly applying Abood and Keller, with the dissent arguing the 
contrary.155 
First, in Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc.,156 the Court 
addressed whether producers could be compelled to contribute to a 
―California Summer Fruits‖ advertising scheme.  That scheme was a small 
part of a set of economic regulations, promulgated by the Secretary of 
Agriculture, designed to regularize the price and quality of fruit and protect 
farmers‘ incomes.157  The Glickman plaintiffs articulated a range of 
objections to the advertisements, including that they considered some 
aspects of the ads (such as the claim that ―red colored fruit is superior‖) to 
be untrue, that they felt the ads promoted ―the ‗socialistic programs‘ of the 
Secretary,‖ and that they felt the ads promoted ―sexually subliminal 
messages.‖158  However, the district court doubted whether these objections 
were sincere.159 
 
dues under Keller. Rules and Bylaws, D.C. BAR, http://www.dcbar.org/about-the-bar/rules-
and-bylaws/rule-02.cfm (last visited Oct. 19, 2014). 
 154. In the third case, Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, the Court held that a similar 
advertising scheme was government speech, rather than speech of a private group. 544 U.S. 
550, 559 (2005).  Because the government is entitled to espouse particular views, the 
advertising program did not violate the First Amendment. Id. 
 155. See generally United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405 (2001); Glickman v. 
Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997). 
 156. 521 U.S. 457 (1997). 
 157. Id. at 461.  The Glickman plaintiffs objected not just to the compelled advertising 
subsidy but also to various rules against selling small or immature fruit. 
 158. Id. at 467 n.10. 
 159. Id. at 467. 
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Like in Abood and Keller, the Court found it significant that the 
compelled subsidy was ―part of a broader collective enterprise in which [the 
plaintiff‘s] freedom to act independently is already constrained by the 
regulatory scheme.‖160  Thus, as in those cases, compelled subsidization of 
speech could be justified by the presence of an important, broader scheme, 
of which the compelled subsidization was a necessary part.  However, the 
Glickman Court then went further, holding that compelled advertising did 
not even implicate the First Amendment.  In particular, the Court relied on 
three aspects of the advertising scheme.  First, ―the marketing orders 
impose[d] no restraint on the freedom of any producer to communicate any 
message to any audience,‖161 meaning that the producers were free to 
convey any message they chose—even, for example, that red fruits were not 
superior—through their own advertising.  Second, the compulsion was 
merely a subsidy, which ―[did] not compel any person to engage in any 
actual or symbolic speech.‖162  Finally, the Court held that the 
advertisements ―do not compel the producers to endorse or to finance any 
political or ideological views.‖163  Here, the Court flatly rejected the 
argument that compelled subsidy of speech always implicates the First 
Amendment, regardless of the content of the speech:  ―[R]equiring 
respondents to pay the assessments cannot be said to engender any crisis of 
conscience. . . . The mere fact that objectors believe their money is not 
being well spent ‗does not mean [that] they have a First Amendment 
complaint.‘‖164 
The Court took a dramatically different approach just four years later in 
United States v. United Foods,165 striking down a compelled subsidy for 
generic mushroom advertising.  For the United Foods Court, the key feature 
that distinguished the mushroom advertising scheme from the fruit 
advertisements in Glickman was the absence of a comprehensive scheme of 
collective economic regulation, as were present in Abood and Keller.166  
Thus, the compelled subsidization could not be justified based on its 
necessary role in an important broader program.  Importantly, though, the 
majority also characterized the objection at issue very differently.  Unlike 
the Glickman Court‘s assessment that a producer‘s desire not to fund 
 
 160. Id. at 469. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 469–70. 
 164. Id. at 472 (quoting Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 456 
(1984)). 
 165. 533 U.S. 405 (2001).  United Foods did not overrule Glickman, instead 
distinguishing it based on the presence of a larger scheme of economic regulation in 
Glickman. Id. at 414–15.  That distinction has been criticized by many, but not all, 
commentators. E.g., Seana Shiffrin, Compelled Association, Morality, and Market 
Dynamics, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 317, 321 (2007).  The two cases took radically different 
approaches to describing the relevant objections:  as disagreement with business strategy in 
Glickman and disagreement with speech imbued with First Amendment value in United 
Foods. United Foods, 553 U.S. at 405; Glickman, 521 U.S. at 470. 
 166. United Foods, 553 U.S. at 413 (―[I]t is only the overriding associational purpose 
which allows any compelled subsidy for speech in the first place.‖). 
2014] META RIGHTS 881 
advertising is fundamentally an economic objection—a mere desire not to 
pay—the United Foods Court considered the producer-plaintiff to be 
―object[ing] to the idea being advanced.‖167  Accordingly, the Court 
characterized the producer‘s objection in terms of core First Amendment 
values:  ―[T]here is no apparent [First Amendment] principle distinguishing 
out of hand minor debates about whether a branded mushroom is better than 
just any mushroom.‖168  The negative implication of this statement is that 
the United Foods holding—that compelled subsidization is acceptable 
where it is part of a broader scheme of collective economic regulation—
applies to subsidization of even political speech. 
Finally, unlike Glickman, where there was no meta rights question 
because the Court found no First Amendment rights were at stake, United 
Foods at least theoretically presented such a question.  After all, there was 
only one plaintiff in United Foods, suggesting that other mushroom growers 
were willing payers, or at least that they had not objected so strongly as to 
file a lawsuit.  Thus, the Court could have held that United Foods had a 
right to opt out of the mandatory assessment, and then moved on to 
consider whether and how other producers‘ rights to opt out would be 
protected through notice and other structural procedures. 
However, the Court instead simply declared that ―the assessments are not 
permitted under the First Amendment.‖169  Even though this formulation 
was not the result of conscious consideration of the meta rights question, it 
is telling that the Court chose not to articulate its holding in terms of 
whether producers could be compelled to pay, focusing instead on the 
assessment itself.  In effect, the Court‘s holding was tantamount to creating 
an opt-in default, in which producers that still wanted to fund generic 
advertising would have to affirmatively choose to get together and share the 
costs of advertising. 
D.   Rights and Meta Rights Not to Speak or Associate 
In addition to the compelled subsidization cases described above, the 
Court has also confronted compelled speech and association directly in a 
handful of cases.  While the Knox Court conflated compelled speech with 
compelled subsidization170—a move that was perhaps unsurprising 
following the Court‘s treatment of spending as equivalent to speech in cases 
like Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,171 as well as in 
 
 167. Id. at 410. 
 168. Id. at 411. 
 169. Id. at 416 (emphasis added). 
 170. Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int‘l Union Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2289 (2012) (stating 
that ―compulsory fees constitute a form of compelled speech and association‖). 
 171. 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see also Deborah Hellman, Money Talks but It Isn’t Speech, 95 
MINN. L. REV. 953, 994–95 (2011) (observing that the Citizens United Court ―considered it 
so obvious that restrictions on spending money amount to restrictions on speech that it 
needed no discussion at all, not even a citation to Buckley [v. Valeo]‖). 
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United Foods172—commentators and earlier cases draw a distinction 
between the two, emphasizing that compelled speech was more serious than 
compelled subsidization.173  Yet, no court has ever held that meta rights are 
required to protect First Amendment rights against compelled speech itself. 
1.   Public Education 
In the well-known early case Pierce v. Society of Sisters,174 the Court 
held that parents have a Fourteenth Amendment right to choose private 
school over public school for their children, though states could impose 
reasonable requirements on private schools to ensure that students were 
properly prepared for the requirements of citizenship.175  The Court went 
further in Wisconsin v. Yoder,176 holding that Amish children and parents 
(though not necessarily other children and parents) had a First Amendment 
right to be excused from mandatory schooling altogether.177  Thus, parents 
may choose private school over public school for any reason, and parents 
may opt out of secondary schooling for their child altogether at least where 
school poses an existential threat to a religious group with a track record of 
appropriately caring for its members.  However, these opt-out rights are not 
accompanied by any notice or procedural protections designed to ensure 
that parents are aware of their First Amendment rights.178  (Nor may 
taxpayers opt out of subsidizing schools or other programs that express 
messages with which they disagree.179) 
 
 172. United Foods, 533 U.S. at 511; see also Dayna B. Royal, Resolving the Compelled-
Commercial-Speech Conundrum, 19 VA. J. SOC. POL‘Y & L. 205, 226 (2011) (observing that 
the United Foods Court cited compelled speech cases in support of its conclusion). 
 173. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 239–40 (2000) (Souter, J., 
concurring) (stating that compelled speech cases raise more serious concerns than the 
compelled subsidy issue presented in Southworth); Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, 
Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 470–71 (1997) (holding that compelled speech cases were ―clearly 
inapplicable‖ in compelled subsidization context); Bodie, supra note 90, at 213 n.51; Sachs, 
supra note 93, at 857–58 (distinguishing between compelled speech and compelled 
subsidization and noting that the ―the line between these two categories is not a clean one‖); 
cf. Kathleen M. Sullivan & Robert C. Post, It’s What’s for Lunch:  Nectarines, Mushrooms, 
and Beef—The First Amendment and Compelled Speech, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 359, 370 
(2007) (―[T]he only reason that compelled subsidization of speech can possibly raise a 
constitutional question is that it may be regarded as a form of compelled speech.‖). 
 174. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 175. Id. at 534–35. 
 176. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 177. Id. at 222. 
 178. This is not to say that parents do not become aware of their rights to homeschool 
from other sources.  To the contrary, the idea of a ―right to homeschool‖ has gained 
popularity in recent years, due in part to the activities of advocacy groups. Robin L. West, 
Tragic Rights:  The Rights Critique in the Age of Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 713, 
732–34 (2011) (documenting how the idea of right to homeschool has ―gained considerable 
support in lower courts, state legislatures, and among some segments of the public‖).  In 
Part II, I discuss the significance of the availability of ―outside‖ information about rights to 
the development of meta rights. 
 179. See generally United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).  Some scholars have 
convincingly critiqued the Court‘s distinction between compelled subsidization of speech in 
the tax context, where objectors may not opt out, and other contexts. E.g., Post, supra note 
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Relatedly, courts have addressed questions pertaining to parents‘ and 
students‘ desires to attend public school but opt out of certain aspects of the 
curriculum.  In particular, the Supreme Court has twice addressed whether 
students may be compelled to say the Pledge of Allegiance as a condition of 
attending public school.  Notoriously, the Court in Minersville School 
District v. Gobitis180 held that students belonging to the Jehovah‘s Witness 
faith had no First Amendment right to opt out of reciting the Pledge of 
Allegiance, forcing those students to choose between their faiths and public 
school attendance.  The Court relied primarily on the government‘s interest 
in ―the promotion of national cohesion,‖ stating that ―[n]ational unity is the 
basis of national security.‖181  However, the Court also relied in part on 
religious parents‘ rights to enroll their children in private school,182 
implying that the opportunity to opt out completely (however illusory, 
given the cost of private or religious schools) made the lack of a partial opt-
out right constitutionally acceptable. 
The Court reversed Gobitis just three years later in West Virginia State 
Board of Education v. Barnette,183 holding for the first time that the First 
Amendment encompasses a right against compelled speech.184  Though the 
Barnette plaintiffs, like the Gobitis plaintiffs, had religious objections to 
reciting the Pledge, the Court did not limit its holding to the religious.  
However, it did explain its holding in terms of convictions:  ―We can have 
intellectual individualism and the rich cultural diversities that we owe to 
exceptional minds only at the price of occasional eccentricity and abnormal 
attitudes . . . freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter 
much.‖185  Accordingly, Barnette rejected the power of states to protect 
national unity by ―expel[ling] a handful of children from school‖ for 
refusing to say the Pledge.186 
Courts following Barnette have been reluctant to allow students attending 
public school to opt out of other portions of the curriculum, particularly 
when the objection is not motivated by religious belief.187  Moreover, 
courts have not imposed any obligation on schools to inform students or 
parents of their Barnette rights, despite the fact that teachers routinely lead 
students in saying the Pledge of Allegiance, and evidence that at least some 
schools still punish students who decline to say the Pledge.188  Yet, even 
 
85, at 196 (arguing that the reasoning of United Foods, if taken to its logical extreme, would 
mean that courts must review the use of taxes to fund government speech). 
 180. 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
 181. Id. at 595. 
 182. Id. at 599 (citing Pierce v. Soc‘y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)). 
 183. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 184. Id. at 633–34. 
 185. Id. at 641–42. 
 186. Id. at 636. 
 187. Noa Ben-Asher, The Lawmaking Family, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 363, 386–87 (2012). 
 188. Martin Guggenheim, Stealth Indoctrination:  Forced Speech in the Classroom, 2004 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57, 72–73 (discussing prevalence of teacher-led recitation of the Pledge, 
and lack of student knowledge about Barnette rights); Abner S. Greene, The Pledge of 
Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 451, 469 (1995) (discussing constitutionality of 
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where Barnette rights have been violated, decision makers tailor remedies 
much more narrowly.  When these violations are rooted in statutes requiring 
Pledge recitation, attorneys ask courts to strike down the statutes.189  
Conversely, many cases arising from idiosyncratic decisions by teachers or 
school districts are resolved via a sternly worded letter to the superintendent 
from an ACLU attorney.190  Where that strategy is unsuccessful, students 
and parents may file suit, but they typically limit their demands for 
injunctive relief to an order preventing school district officials from 
punishing students who do not say the Pledge.191  And, while a handful of 
civil libertarians have advocated for legislative or regulatory reform 
requiring school officials to inform students of their Barnette rights, such 
efforts have yet to yield results.192 
2.   License Plates 
The Court also found compelled speech in Wooley v. Maynard,193 and on 
that basis struck down a criminal conviction for violating New Hampshire‘s 
requirement that drivers display the state motto ―Live Free or Die‖ on their 
license plates.  Maynard had repeatedly either covered the motto with tape 
or cut part of it out of his plates because the motto conflicted with his 
religious faith.194 
 
teacher-led recitations of the Pledge); see also supra notes 154, 165 (cases finding violations 
of Barnette rights). 
 189. Circle Sch. v. Pappert, 381 F.3d 172, 181–83 (3d Cir. 2004) (striking down state 
statute requiring parental notification when students declined to say the Pledge and holding 
that statute requiring private school personnel to lead students in the Pledge was 
unconstitutional); Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437, 445 (7th Cir. 
1992) (concluding that Illinois statute did not on its face compel students to recite the Pledge 
and noting absence of record evidence about whether schools in fact required all students to 
say the Pledge); Lane v. Owens, No. 03-B-1544 (D. Colo. Aug. 15, 2003), available at 
http://static.aclu-co.org/wp-content/uploads/files/200309_309pledge_Courts_Oral_ 
Ruling_8-15-03.pdf (order granting temporary injunction against operation of statute 
permitting only students with religious objections from foregoing Pledge recitation). 
 190. Emily Garber, Students Not Required to Participate in the Pledge of Allegiance, 
ACLU, http://aclu-or.org/blog/students-not-required-participate-pledge-allegiance 
(discussing ACLU attorney‘s efforts to stop compelled Pledge recitation in an Oregon 
elementary school) (last visited Oct. 19, 2014); Dotty Griffith, ACLU of Texas Protects 
Students First Amendment Rights; Sweeny School Officials Must Change Unconstitutional 
Policy, ACLU (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.aclutx.org/2011/04/14/aclu-of-texas-protects-
students%E2%80%99-first-amendment-rights-sweeney-school-officials-must-change-
unconstitutional-policy/ (discussing ACLU challenge to Texas school district requirement 
that students stand during Pledge). 
 191. E.g., Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1268–69 (11th Cir. 
2004) (finding genuine issue of fact as to whether school punished student for failing to 
recite Pledge; student sought compensatory and declaratory relief); Rabideau v. 
Beekmantown Cent. Sch. Dist., 89 F. Supp. 2d. 263, 268 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (denying 
summary judgment for the district based on record evidence suggesting student was 
punished for refusing to participate in Pledge). 
 192. Pledge of Confusion?  Schools Wrestle with Flag Policy in Classroom, FOX NEWS 
(Sept. 15, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2009/09/15/pledge-confusion-schools-
wrestle-with-flag-policy-in-classroom/. 
 193. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
 194. Id. at 707–08. 
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The Court first held that the license plate requirement constituted 
compelled speech because it ―force[d] an individual, as part of his daily 
life . . . to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological 
point of view he finds unacceptable.‖195  Then, the Court applied the 
compelled speech principles announced in Barnette.  Overturning the 
conviction, the Court stated that ―[a] system which secures the right to 
proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee 
the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts.  The right to speak 
and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of 
the broader concept of ‗individual freedom of mind.‘‖196  Further, the Court 
rejected the State‘s attempt to justify the license plate requirement based on 
either its interest in identifying cars, or its desire ―to communicate to others 
an official view as to proper appreciation of history, state pride, and 
individualism.‖197 
In overturning the convictions, the Court held that New Hampshire ―may 
not require appellees to display the state motto upon their vehicle license 
plates,‖ and affirmed an injunction entered by the district court.198  That 
injunction prevented New Hampshire officials from arresting or prosecuting 
the Maynards for covering the state motto.199  However, the district court 
refused the additional relief sought by the Maynards:  an injunction 
requiring New Hampshire to issue new license plates not containing the 
motto.200  Thus, the Maynards could be assured that they would not be 
convicted of a crime for covering the state motto with tape, but were 
nonetheless required to take that affirmative step in order to avoid unwanted 
expression. 
Neither the district court nor the Supreme Court held that the case 
demanded any notice or structural protections.  Moreover, the statute 
requiring ―Live Free or Die‖ to be written on all New Hampshire passenger 
vehicle license plates remains on the books, and it is still a criminal offense 
to obscure the ―figures or letters‖ on any plate.201  Of course, anyone who 
obscures the state motto for religious or political reasons would have a good 
First Amendment defense to criminal charges (or could raise the issue 
affirmatively in a declaratory judgment action).  However, a political or 
religious objector who is aware of state law (perhaps having been informed 
by a clerk at the DMV or a state trooper) but not the Maynard decision may 
be unwilling to risk prosecution in order to avoid displaying the motto. 
 
 195. Id. at 715.  The Court observed that the infringement in Wooley was less severe than 
that of Barnette because displaying a license plate is a ―passive act,‖ but described the 
difference between the two cases as ―essentially one of degree.‖ Id. 
 196. Id. at 714 (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)). 
 197. Id. at 717. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Maynard v. Wooley, 406 F. Supp. 1381, 1389 (D.N.H. 1976). 
 200. Id. (observing that ―New Hampshire could easily issue plaintiffs license plates that 
do not contain the motto,‖ but declining to issue the injunction because ―[t]he relief we have 
ordered should fully protect plaintiffs in the exercise of their First Amendment rights, and 
we would be ill-advised to interfere further with the operation of New Hampshire‘s system 
of vehicle identification‖). 
 201. N.H. REV. STAT. §§ 261:75, :176 (2014). 
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This part has defined meta rights and traced their development in a range 
of contexts.  The next part turns to the normative questions of when meta 
rights are called for and how they should be structured.  It argues for the 
importation of the self-help principle from the Miranda and class action 
contexts to the compelled speech and subsidization context, and then 
considers the availability of self-help in various compelled speech and 
subsidization contexts.  Then, it argues that, in structuring meta rights in the 
compelled speech and subsidization contexts, courts must consider the 
potential speech-discouraging effects of particular types of meta rights. 
II.   RATIONALIZING META RIGHTS 
There are many convincing criticisms of the Court‘s approach to rights 
against compelled speech and subsidization.  For example, Robert Post 
observes that much compelled speech and subsidization does not trigger 
First Amendment scrutiny at all, even where it seems to present equal or 
more serious concerns than those in cases like United Foods.202  Catherine 
Fisk and Erwin Chemerinsky have argued convincingly that the Court‘s 
compelled speech and subsidization cases reflect reluctance to empower 
union leaders, relative to leaders of other groups, to take positions that 
conflict with the group‘s membership.203  Others have shown that, even 
leaving aside inconsistencies between cases, the Court‘s reasoning is often 
flimsy; for example, the Court has not offered a persuasive explanation for 
why the requirement that one display a license plate with a controversial 
state motto on it equates to compelled speech by drivers, given that anyone 
viewing the message would be nearly certain to understand the message to 
be that of the state, not of the individual.204 
While I agree with many of these critiques, I turn here to the separate 
issue of the Court‘s approach to meta rights in these cases.  The Court has 
never convincingly explained why, when, and to what extent constitutional 
meta rights are required at all; rather, meta rights have developed on a 
largely ad hoc basis.  Further, when meta rights are called for, it is not clear 
why simple notice of the right to opt out is sometimes insufficient, as the 
Court held in Knox and United Foods.205 
One way to shape meta rights in the compelled speech and subsidization 
context would be to simply determine how dissenters could be protected to 
the maximum extent possible.  However, the Court has implicitly rejected 
this approach, and it has held in many other contexts that speakers may be 
required to take action—and even to overcome genuine barriers—in order 
 
 202. Post, supra note 85, at 210 (noting that many instances in which government 
compels speech or subsidization, such as when a litigant must pay the other side‘s attorneys‘ 
fees, do not violate the First Amendment, despite their similarity to speech in which the 
Court has found a First Amendment violation). 
 203. See generally Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 85. 
 204. Greene, supra note 188, at 473–74; cf. Laurent Sacharoff, Listener Interests in 
Compelled Speech Cases, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 329, 370 (2008) (arguing that there is a First 
Amendment right against compelled speech that listeners would not attribute to speaker). See 
generally Larry Alexander, Compelled Speech, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 147 (2006). 
 205. See supra Part I.C. 
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to speak or avoid speech.206  For example, cities may require parade 
organizers to pay money to obtain required permits well in advance of a 
parade.207  Similarly, they may require speakers to learn about and comply 
with time, place, and manner restrictions on their speech, even when doing 
so involves transaction costs.208  Likewise, Citizens United rejected 
shareholder protection as a compelling state interest in limiting corporate 
political spending because shareholders could engage in corporate 
democracy or sell their shares to avoid funding unwanted corporate political 
speech.209  In other words, the Constitution does not require the elimination 
of all disincentives to speak or not speak, and it does not matter whether the 
source of those disincentives is the government, an associational speaker 
itself, or unrelated individuals.  A fortiori, then, there is a good argument 
that the fact that a potential dissenter must make his or her preferences 
known, as in the union or class action context, does not implicate the First 
Amendment at all. 
Further, some meta rights impose significant burdens on the institutions 
calling for speech or subsidization, as well as their constituents who wish to 
speak in concert.210  For example, the Hudson procedure imposes 
significant costs on unions that both engage in political advocacy and 
charge bargaining unit members for the costs of representation.211  Yet, the 
Court fails to account for the rights of willing speakers—both institutions 
and members—in its analysis.  Thus, to the extent meta rights are 
appropriate in the First Amendment context, a more nuanced approach to 
structuring them is needed. 
This part proceeds from the premise—evident in the Court‘s own 
holdings—that meta rights are not called for as a matter of course in the 
compelled speech and subsidization arena.  The first question, then, is 
whether there is a principle or set of principles according to which courts 
can determine whether meta rights are necessary.  The compelled speech 
and subsidization cases do not themselves contain a coherent justification 
for meta rights.  However, as discussed in Part I, the Court has elsewhere 
called for meta rights when individuals cannot invoke their rights through 
self-help alone.  I argue that this principle is sound and could likewise 
 
 206. The First Amendment is not unique here—the Court has permitted government to 
erect barriers to the exercise of constitutional rights in other areas of law.  As described 
previously, supra note 26, courts explicitly discourage criminal defendants from exercising 
their Faretta rights—an anti-meta right.  Further, the Court has permitted government actors 
to discourage individuals from invoking some constitutional rights without requiring any 
counterbalancing meta rights. See e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 874 (1992) (allowing states to discourage women from choosing abortion, providing 
they do not unduly burden women‘s exercise of their abortion rights). 
 207. Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992) (holding permit 
requirements constitutional in order to ―regulate competing uses of public forums‖ provided 
certain additional requirements are satisfied). 
 208. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 812 (1989). 
 209. Citizens United v. FEC, 588 U.S. 310, 361–62 (2010). 
 210. See infra Part II.C. 
 211. As I have argued elsewhere, these requirements are analogous to the procedures that 
the Court struck down in Citizens United because they imposed too great a burden on 
corporate and union political speech. Garden, supra note 93, at 43. 
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prove useful in deciding meta rights questions in the compelled speech 
context. 
This part concludes by discussing the form that meta rights should take.  
Here, I take as my starting point the Court‘s premise in Knox that an opt-out 
requirement can itself violate the First Amendment if it results in bargaining 
unit members subsidizing union political speech, either because of inertia, 
or because the speech default itself affects their decision about whether to 
subsidize speech.  Accordingly, this discussion proceeds on the assumption 
that speech defaults implicate the First Amendment.  While that legal 
conclusion is itself contestable (as noted above), it is nonetheless worth 
playing out its consequences.  These include the possibility that under 
Knox‘s First Amendment premises, an opt-in default is, if anything, more 
problematic than an opt-out default. 
A.   Meta Rights and the Self-Help Principle 
Why should meta rights guard against some—but not all—compelled 
speech and subsidization?  Is there a justification for treating union 
members and lawyers differently from, say, public school children who 
may wish to opt out of the Pledge of Allegiance, and for protecting food 
producers most of all? 
The Court‘s own answer to these questions is thin at best.  Unlike in 
Miranda, where the Court offered a robust explanation of why notice rights 
were necessary in the custodial interrogation context,212 the Court‘s 
compelled speech and subsidization cases offer little explanation of why 
meta rights are (or are not) provided.  For example, the Hudson Court 
offered the following explanation for the development of meta rights in the 
union context: 
Procedural safeguards are necessary . . . for two reasons.  First, although 
the government interest in labor peace is strong enough to support an 
―agency shop‖ notwithstanding its limited infringement on nonunion 
employees‘ constitutional rights, the fact that those rights are protected by 
the First Amendment requires that the procedure be carefully tailored to 
minimize the infringement. Second, the nonunion employee—the 
individual whose First Amendment rights are being affected—must have 
a fair opportunity to identify the impact of the governmental action on his 
interests and to assert a meritorious First Amendment claim.213 
But these are hardly reasons at all.  The first simply restates the basic 
First Amendment principle that infringements of First Amendment rights 
must not only be justified by a sufficiently important state interest but also 
must be tailored to achieve that interest.214  However, whether an agency 
fee is tailored to achieve the state interest in labor peace through the 
exclusive representation system has nothing to do with meta rights.  The 
 
 212. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 213. Chi. Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 302–03 (1985) (footnotes omitted). 
 214. Underscoring this point, the Hudson Court cited a list of cases, quoting language 
describing the narrow tailoring requirement in parentheticals. See id. at 303 n.11. 
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second states that objectors must be able to challenge an improperly 
assessed agency fee but does not explain why doing so requires meta rights; 
after all, dissenters could always file a lawsuit in state or federal court, as 
most civil liberties plaintiffs (including the parents of children who have 
been wrongly compelled to say the Pledge of Allegiance) must do.  The 
Court later rejects this argument in conclusory fashion:  because ―the 
agency shop itself is ‗a significant impingement on First Amendment 
rights,‘ the government and union have a responsibility to provide 
procedures that minimize that impingement and that facilitate a nonunion 
employee‘s ability to protect his rights.‖215 
Hudson‘s only other explanatory statement comes in a footnote:  
―Procedural safeguards often have a special bite in the First Amendment 
context.‖216  This statement is followed by a list of citations to general First 
Amendment principles, such as the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines.  
Here again, these principles do not explain why meta rights are necessary in 
the union (or bar dues) context; they simply explain that courts approach 
first order questions about First Amendment rights in a way designed to 
ensure adequate First Amendment ―breathing space.‖217  In other words, the 
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines do not notify people of their First 
Amendment rights, nor do they encourage individuals to invoke their 
rights—they simply make it more likely that plaintiffs will succeed if they 
become aware of their rights and choose to file suit.  To be sure, the 
existence of First Amendment doctrines like vagueness and overbreadth 
may make plaintiffs more willing to sue by strengthening what would 
 
 215. Id. at 307–08 n.20 (quoting Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 
(1984)).  The Court offers a similar—and similarly unhelpful—explanation for the notice 
requirement.   
Basic considerations of fairness, as well as concern for the First Amendment rights 
at stake, also dictate that the potential objectors be given sufficient information to 
gauge the propriety of the union‘s fee.  Leaving the nonunion employees in the 
dark about the source of the figure for the agency fee—and requiring them to 
object in order to receive information—does not adequately protect the careful 
distinctions drawn in Abood.  
Id. at 306. 
 216. Id. at 303 n.12 (quoting G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 1373 (10th ed. 1980)). 
 217. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432–33 (1963) (citations omitted) (―The 
objectionable quality of vagueness and overbreadth does not depend upon absence of fair 
notice to a criminally accused or upon unchanneled delegation of legislative powers, but 
upon the danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the existence of a 
penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application. . . .  Because First 
Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area 
only with narrow specificity.‖).  The doctrines cited by the Court are closer to the 
―prophylactic rights‖ that David Strauss discusses in The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules. See 
generally Strauss, supra note 20.  These are decisional rules that reduce the risk that 
impermissible government action will go unremedied. See id. at 196–97 (discussing, in the 
First Amendment context, how ―the requirement of clear standards reduces the danger that 
speech will be suppressed unlawfully‖).  While it is almost certainly the case that meta rights 
also decrease the likelihood of First Amendment violations, and therefore meta rights might 
be considered a subspecies of prophylactic rights, the existence of some prophylactic rights 
in the First Amendment context does not explain the need for meta rights in some contexts 
and not others. 
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otherwise be weak or nonexistent claims,218 but the same can be said any 
time rights are strengthened.  What is different about meta rights like those 
established in Hudson is that they put into place structures designed to 
educate potential objectors about rights themselves or about relevant facts 
on the ground that otherwise would not be available until the discovery 
stage of a lawsuit.  Or else—as in the case of Knox‘s opt-in requirement—
meta rights encourage individuals to choose (or to default into) rights, such 
as non-speech instead of speech.219  Subsequent cases, including Knox, 
offer little additional clarity.  The agricultural advertising cases are 
similarly silent on this issue. 
This state of affairs stands in contrast to Miranda, where the Court 
offered a far more detailed description of why a warning is sometimes 
necessary to the enforcement of the right against self-incrimination—
specifically, that police are specially trained to discourage rights 
invocations and that, by design, individuals in police custody do not have 
other sources of information available to them, thereby decreasing suspects‘ 
baseline level of willingness or ability to invoke their rights.220  In other 
words, Miranda‘s meta rights are designed to counteract coercive 
conditions that make self-help implausible; where such conditions are not 
present (as during the traffic stop in Berkemer), police need not notify 
individuals of their rights against self-incrimination, whether or not they are 
actually aware of them. 
The reason for notice rights in the class action context (and the 
procedural due process context generally) is similarly clear.  As the Mullane 
Court emphasized, the danger is that absent plaintiffs may literally have no 
idea that a class action has been filed.221  Even without the coercion that is 
present in the Miranda context, self-help is implausible; for absent class 
members to exercise their opt-out rights without first having received notice 
of the case itself, they would have to monitor court dockets around the 
country.222  Likewise, procedural due process requires that individuals 
 
 218. The overbreadth doctrine allows plaintiffs to challenge a law if ―a substantial 
number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute‘s plainly 
legitimate sweep,‖ even if the plaintiff‘s own speech may constitutionally be regulated. 
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (citing Wash. State Grange v. Wash. 
State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008)).  Thus, a speaker who lacks a 
plausible argument that the government is impermissibly restricting his own speech may 
nonetheless decide to sue if the applicable statute impermissibly regulates others‘ speech. 
 219. I discuss why the opt-in default encourages bargaining unit or bar association 
members to exercise their rights not to pay only the agency fee portion of union or bar dues 
in Part II.C.2. 
 220. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 221. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319 (1950). 
 222. This explains why Mullane requires that class members be notified of the existence 
of a lawsuit to which they are parties but does not necessarily explain why class members 
must be advised of their rights to opt out.  However, reasons are readily apparent.  First, a 
notice that simply informs class members of their party status could be subtly misleading, as 
class members may naturally assume that the notice is a complete accounting of everything 
they need to know about the class action.  Second, the marginal costs of providing 
information about opt-out rights is negligible.  Third, class counsel, who is responsible for 
effectuating the mandatory notice, owes a fiduciary duty to absent class members, which is 
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receive notice of basic facts necessary to participate meaningfully in a 
hearing, but not notice of their legal rights.223 
The reasoning behind the Miranda warning and the class action 
notice/opt-out scheme both point towards the feasibility of self-help as an 
overarching guiding principle in determining whether meta rights are 
necessary to protect rights against compelled speech and subsidization.  
While it is not always wise or appropriate to import principles from one 
constitutional context into another,224 several factors here weigh in favor of 
importing.  First, the use of similar interpretive tools across constitutional 
contexts promotes predictability in the development of the law.  Second, 
there is the relative similarity of the underlying factual circumstances; each 
context involves a state actor‘s request that individuals waive constitutional 
privileges not to speak (or, in the class action context, not to petition).  
Third, there is the practical point that, absent any other useful explanation 
of meta rights in the compelled speech and subsidization context, self-help 
holds out promise as an organizing principle.  Finally, the Court itself has at 
times suggested that self-help is relevant to the compelled speech and 
subsidization analysis.225 
Accordingly, I next consider the extent to which the Court‘s 
jurisprudence in the compelled speech and subsidization context already 
 
consistent with providing class members with information about possible courses of action in 
a case. See Debra Lyn Bassett, The Defendant’s Obligation to Ensure Adequate 
Representation in Class Actions, 74 UMKC L. REV. 511, 513 (2006) (―[C]lass counsel‘s 
responsibility to ensure that absent class members are accorded adequate representation is a 
serious and central due process obligation—indeed, class counsel owes a fiduciary duty to 
the absent class members.‖). 
 223. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 224. See Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring:  Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and 
Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 676 (2011) (providing an ―account of the strategic 
deployment of borrowing to narrow constitutional remedial doctrine, and of convergence‘s 
acceleration of that effect, offer[ing] a rare look at the darker side of these processes‖). 
 225. For example, the Court relied in part upon the availability of self-help in determining 
that there had been no First Amendment violation in CLS v. Martinez, a case about whether a 
religious student group was entitled to exemption from a public university‘s ―all comers‖ 
policy. 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978–79 (2010).  The Court rejected CLS‘s claim in part because 
CLS could easily avoid the ―all comers‖ policy by simply not seeking recognition as a 
student group, and instead meeting off-campus.  Thus, the relative ease of opting out of the 
entire student group program supported the Court‘s conclusion that Hastings did not have to 
exempt CLS from the ―all comers‖ policy.  While CLS involved a rights question (rather 
than a meta rights question), factors undergirding a holding of no First Amendment violation 
should apply a fortiori to the question of whether First Amendment rights-holders require the 
protection provided by meta rights.  In addition, the Gobitis Court observed that parents 
could opt out of sending their children to public school and implied that the ability to opt out 
of public school altogether lessened the burden imposed on First Amendment rights by 
requiring students to recite the Pledge. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 598–
99 (1940) (citing Pierce v. Soc‘y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1923)).  However, while it is 
undoubtedly true that the right to enroll their children in private school could have protected 
some parents who wanted Pledge-free schooling for their children, private school is beyond 
the reach of many parents (and ignores situations in which children and parents disagree 
about the desirability of saying the Pledge).  Thus, the rejection of Gobitis in Barnette does 
not undermine the relevance of self-help to this analysis, particularly considering the 
Martinez Court‘s reliance on that consideration. 
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reflects the plausibility of self-help in different compelled speech and 
subsidization contexts. 
B.   Self-Help and Compelled Speech and Subsidization 
As this section shows, it is relatively easy for dissenters to exercise their 
First Amendment rights against compelled speech or subsidization—easier, 
certainly, than it is for suspects undergoing custodial interrogation to 
exercise their Fifth Amendment rights to silence, or for absent class 
members to discover their status without notice.  Still, the extent to which 
self-help is a realistic strategy varies among different compelled speech and 
subsidization contexts.  Consideration of the ease and availability of self-
help in the context of compelled speech and subsidization suggests that at 
best, meta rights should be distributed differently than they currently are; 
arguably, they are mostly unnecessary.  Accordingly, this section discusses 
the likelihood that different groups of potential dissenters would be able to 
exercise their rights against compelled speech or subsidization without the 
benefit of meta rights. 
The self-help rationale could be implicated either by Miranda-style 
coercion226 or where the facts needed to understand that rights are at stake 
are somehow hidden, as in the class action and procedural due process 
contexts.  Importantly, this lack of factual knowledge is distinct from 
situations in which individuals are aware of the facts that give rise to a 
right, but unaware of the legal consequences of those facts—as the saying 
goes, ignorance of the law is no excuse.227 
Accordingly, this section discusses barriers to remaining silent or 
declining to subsidize speech in the various contexts in which the Court has 
found a right to avoid compelled speech or subsidization.  It also discusses 
the closely related issue of government interests in not providing meta 
rights, such as expense or disruption. 
1.   Barnette Rights 
While Barnette rights are not accompanied by meta rights,228 Barnette 
violations raise significant questions about self-help and coercion.  Schools 
 
 226. In the Miranda context, police questioning encourages individuals to waive their 
rights to remain silent.  However, it is less clear that institutional actions in the compelled 
speech context should be viewed as soliciting waivers of the right not to speak, rather than 
soliciting individuals to exercise their affirmative right to speak.  The latter characterization 
emphasizes that both not speaking and speaking are protected First Amendment activity, a 
point taken up again in Part II.C. 
 227. Mark Osiel, Rights to Do Grave Wrong, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 107, 126 (2013) (―Our 
legal system may generally presume a knowledge of the law, as when it declares (with rare 
exceptions) that ‗ignorance of the law is no excuse.‘‖); cf. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules 
& Conduct Rules:  On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 645–48 
(1984) (describing examples and limited counterexamples of maxim that ignorance of the 
law is no excuse).  For a discussion of legal and factual ignorance in the procedural due 
process context, see also supra Part I.B.2. 
 228. Martin Guggenheim offers anecdotal evidence of this, describing a symposium at 
which he asked the audience whether they knew, as elementary children, of their Barnette 
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have unique power over students.  This is in part because of their age; we 
often assume that children cannot invoke their rights in settings where we 
would expect more of adults.229  Further, the Court has observed that an 
atmosphere of vague coercion can pervade the school setting.  In the 
context of school prayer, the Court has recognized these dynamics, holding 
that children are uniquely susceptible to ideological coercion in the form of 
peer pressure, and that this ―indirect coercion‖ can rise to the level of a 
constitutional violation.230  Further, while some parents may assist their 
children in standing up to school officials who would compel the Pledge, 
this is at best a partial solution, akin to saying that the fact that attorneys 
can help suspects invoke their rights to remain silent vitiates the need for 
the Miranda warning. 
Further, schools may prevent students from learning information 
necessary to exercise self-help—school is the most likely setting for 
students to learn of their Barnette rights, and schools that actively violate 
those rights by punishing students who do not say the Pledge are unlikely to 
teach about them.231  As Martin Guggenheim has observed, ―[s]chool 
boards and teachers go about their daily business as if Barnette had ruled 
that teachers may require all students in the class to recite the Pledge.‖232  
And, because students (especially elementary school students) often have 
restricted access to other sources of information about rights (such as the 
internet), a school may in fact be the only available source of information 
about rights not to say the Pledge.  Although this type of legal ignorance is 
typically insufficient to support meta rights, it arguably carries special 
 
rights. See generally Guggenheim, supra note 188.  Only a single person (out of an audience 
of seventy) claimed to have been aware of his or her rights. Id. at 72–73.  It is possible that 
some parents will be aware of students‘ Barnette rights, and counsel their children 
accordingly, though this possibility will not aid students who do not happen to consult with 
their parents about whether they may disobey school officials in the Pledge context. 
 229. See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (2011) (observing, in the 
context of whether student was entitled to Miranda warning during interrogation by police 
officer at child‘s school, that ―[t]he law has historically reflected the same assumption that 
children characteristically lack the capacity to exercise mature judgment and possess only an 
incomplete ability to understand the world around them‖). 
 230. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992) (―[T]he school district‘s supervision 
and control of a high school graduation ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer 
pressure, on attending students to stand as a group or, at least, maintain respectful silence 
during the invocation and benediction.  This pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as 
real as any overt compulsion.‖); see also Greene, supra note 188, at 454 (observing that 
Weisman ―rests . . . on equating psychological coercion with legal coercion in the public 
school setting‖ and arguing that applying this standard in the Pledge of Allegiance context 
would result in a holding that it is unconstitutional for teachers to lead their classes in 
reciting the Pledge). 
 231. Of course, most public schools do not actively compel students to recite the Pledge 
of Allegiance.  However, this fact alone should not defeat the need for meta rights.  
Analogously, the Court has observed that many police departments do not coerce or mistreat 
suspects during custodial interrogations, yet the Court still held that the Miranda warning is 
necessary. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 (1984) (―[W]e have no doubt that, in 
conducting most custodial interrogations of persons arrested for misdemeanor traffic 
offenses, the police behave responsibly . . . the same might be said of custodial 
interrogations of persons arrested for felonies.‖). 
 232. See Guggenheim, supra note 188, at 73. 
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weight where children are concerned.  This is both because it is coupled 
with the coercion described above, and because the presumption of legal 
knowledge is simply weaker.233 
In other words, the argument that meta rights are necessary in the Pledge 
context is relatively strong—at minimum it is stronger than the argument in 
the union or bar association context.  Just as the Miranda Court was 
concerned with the probability that institutional coercion would render 
suspects unable to exercise their rights to silence, coercive features in many 
public schools prevent children from exercising their rights absent 
additional notice or structural protections.  Further, while schools have a 
special need to maintain order, there is no reason that informing students of 
their Barnette rights need be disruptive.  For example, Guggenheim 
proposes that schools should inform students of their Barnette rights in a 
way that ―cultivate[s] an appreciation for the flag by teaching students the 
constitutional principles involved when we permit the flag salute.‖234 
2.   License Plates 
In comparison to the Pledge context, there are fewer barriers to the 
exercise of self-help by those who object to displaying the state motto on 
their license plates, another area in which dissenters receive no meta rights.  
To begin, these objectors are older teenagers or adults—they are necessarily 
old enough both to drive and register a vehicle—so it is reasonable to 
assume that they are at least on inquiry notice of their rights.235 
Yet, barriers are not non-existent.  First, objectors would then have to 
withstand traffic stops by police officers enforcing otherwise lawful 
statutory prohibitions against defacing license plates.  During these stops, 
objectors may have to explain their reasons for defacing the motto in an 
attempt to avoid a ticket, or worse.236  Further, these stops could be 
 
 233. Other areas of law reflect the commonsense idea that children should not be 
presumed to have the same legal awareness as adults. E.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin 
C. Zipursky, Shielding Duty:  How Attending to Assumption of Risk, Attractive Nuisance, 
and Other “Quaint” Doctrines Can Improve Decisionmaking in Negligence Cases, 79 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 329, 353 (2006) (discussing attractive nuisance doctrine‘s reliance on idea ―that 
children constitute a special category of trespasser that ought to be treated differently by the 
law because, among other things, they lack the experience, maturity, and knowledge to grasp 
the significance of ethereal legal boundaries‖). 
 234. Guggenheim, supra note 188, at 81. 
 235. Not only is this assumption reasonable based on drivers‘ ages, it is also 
straightforward even for nonlawyers to find information about Wooley.  For example, a 
Google search for ―defaced license plate First Amendment‖ leads to information about the 
Wooley case, as does a search for ―do I have to display the state motto on my license plate.‖ 
Google Search for ―defaced license plate First Amendment,‖ GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com (search ―defaced license plate First Amendment‖; then click search); 
Google Search for ―do I have to display the state motto on my license plate,‖ GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com (search ―do I have to display the state motto on my license plate‖; 
then click search).  Further, the decision to deface a license plate need not be made on the 
spot and under pressure, in contrast to a decision to invoke one‘s Fifth Amendment rights 
during custodial interrogation. 
 236. A routine traffic stop for a defaced license plate can quickly escalate if, for example, 
the driver is also uninsured, or if police claim to find evidence of another crime during the 
2014] META RIGHTS 895 
daunting; although the Court in Berkemer described the experience of 
withstanding police custody during a traffic stop as considerably less 
coercive than a custodial interrogation, the process of explaining one‘s 
disagreement with the ―majority‖237 to an officer who is likely to agree with 
the majority (and who may not know about Wooley238) could be 
intimidating.239  Still, compelled display of state mottos on license plates 
does not involve the same degree of governmental coercion that existed in 
Miranda, or even that exists in the Barnette context; though empirical 
evidence of police abuse of motorists who do not display the state motto 
could show otherwise, such evidence does not now exist. 
Conversely, there would be some financial cost to providing notice to all 
drivers of their Wooley rights, though these costs would be minimal if state 
motor vehicle departments simply printed a short description of the right 
announced in Wooley on vehicle registration forms.  However, notice rights 
are unlikely to relieve dissenting motorists of the burdens described above 
in any meaningful way, given that they would still have to distinguish 
themselves from scofflaws.  Thus, if meta rights are the exception rather 
than the rule—and it is clear from the Court‘s present case law that this is 
the case—then Wooley seems to be a poor candidate for meta rights. 
3.   Unions and Bar Associations 
As discussed in Part I.C.1–2, objectors are entitled to opt out of funding 
union or bar association political speech, though they may be compelled to 
fund activities that are ―germane‖ to the association‘s mission.  Further, 
union members are entitled to receive annual, individualized notice of their 
opt-out rights, as well as a breakdown showing how the chargeable fee was 
calculated, and a nonjudicial process for challenging that calculation—
attorneys are probably entitled to the same, though courts have been less 
aggressive in this context.240  Finally, union bargaining unit members must 
give affirmative consent to the non-chargeable portion of a midyear dues 
increase (an ―opt-in default‖).241 
 
stop.  In this event, police may be able to seize the vehicle and arrest its occupants.  Further, 
particular jurisdictions may have policies of aggressively pursuing grounds for vehicle 
seizures during traffic stops in order to make up for budget shortfalls. See Sarah Stillman, 
Taken, NEW YORKER, Aug. 12, 2013, at 48, 50 (describing civil forfeitures resulting from 
traffic stops, and reporting that ―[m]any officers contend that their departments would 
collapse if the practice [of civil forfeitures] were too heavily regulated, and that a valuable 
public-safety measure would be lost‖). 
 237. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977). 
 238. Following the Court‘s decision in Wooley, the Maynards moved to Connecticut, 
where they were again ticketed for covering the state motto on their license plate, though the 
ticket was apparently overturned. David Hudson, George Maynard Recalls License-Plate 
Ordeal, Free-Speech Victory, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (Nov. 30, 2001), 
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/george-maynard-recalls-license-plate-ordeal-free-
speech-victory. 
 239. In addition, objectors would have to deface the plates themselves (unless the state 
happens to offer motto-free plates), a task requiring supplies and ingenuity—at minimum, a 
roll of electrical tape, though the dissenter in Wooley also cut the state motto from his plate. 
 240. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 241. See supra Part I.C.1. 
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Put in procedural due process terms, bargaining unit members and 
attorneys are entitled to, at minimum, the equivalent of notice and a 
hearing.242  However, union and bar association meta rights cannot be 
explained by reference to procedural due process.  First, procedural due 
process rights typically do not attach to non-adjudicative deprivations.243  
Second, public employees who undergo the much greater hardship of losing 
their jobs altogether do not always receive as much process as bar 
association or union objectors.244 
Moreover, the case either for coercion or for lack of factual knowledge is 
weak.  As to lack of factual knowledge, there is no mystery surrounding the 
existence of the union or bar association, or the obligation to pay fees to 
either.  Attorneys typically pay their required annual fees by check or credit 
card, making the fact of payment unavoidable.245  Bargaining unit members 
often have their dues or fees deducted automatically from their pay, but 
they often must first consent to the deductions, and in any event the 
payment will be reflected on each employee‘s pay stub every pay period.246  
This should be enough to prompt a dissenting employee to seek information 
about how to opt out of the non-germane portion of union dues; for 
example, the employee might ask a manager or human resources employee. 
More troubling is the fact that the union or bar association itself would be 
the only source of information about the calculation of the chargeable fee.  
If a bar association is recalcitrant about providing this information, 
objectors would be faced with a choice between paying full freight and then 
seeking a refund, or else paying nothing (or paying a fraction of dues based 
on a guess), and risking disciplinary action.  Likewise, employees who 
suspect that the agency fee was improperly calculated would face difficulty 
in verifying their suspicions, though resourceful objectors could find 
information about union spending in annual reports filed by labor unions 
and made available on the Department of Labor website.247  Thus, the case 
for lack of knowledge, while certainly weaker than in other contexts where 
individuals enjoy notice rights, is not entirely nonexistent. 
The possibility of Miranda-level coercion that dissuades objectors from 
invoking their rights, however, is remote at best.  In the bar association 
context, it is unclear that any opportunities for coercion exist at all, given 
 
 242. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 243. United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 244–45 (1973) (noting due process 
distinction between adjudication and other types of government action). 
 244. See supra note 56.  While this goes only to the hardship prong, the other two 
prongs—risk of erroneous deprivation and government interest—do not translate easily into 
this context, which itself suggests another reason that procedural due process does not 
explain the presence of meta rights in this context. 
 245. See, e.g., Automated Installment Plan Enrollment Form, N.Y. BAR ASS‘N, available 
at http://www.nysba.org/uploadedFiles/NYSBA/Membership/Automated_Installment_Plan 
_for_Dues/2014_AIP_Enrollment_Form.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2014). 
 246. Jeffrey H. Keefe, A Reconsideration and Empirical Evaluation of Wellington’s and 
Winter’s, The Unions and the Cities, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL‘Y J. 251, 265 (2013). 
 247. These reports are required by the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 
29 U.S.C. § 431 (2012), and are accessible at http://www.dol.gov/olms/ (last visited Oct. 19, 
2014). 
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that most attorneys have relatively little mandatory contact with their state 
bar associations.  Bargaining unit members, of course, come into contact 
with union representatives and supporters on a regular basis.  However, 
even if union organizers or members pressure workers to pay full freight—
perhaps by posting a list of agency fee payers in the breakroom248—this 
pressure would not rise to the level necessary to dissuade determined 
objectors from opting out, absent extreme circumstances. 
Finally, as outlined here, the presumption of legal knowledge is well-
founded—in fact much more than in the cases like Berkemer.  Attorneys, of 
course, are sophisticated about legal rights; to wit, most state bar exams test 
on the First Amendment.249  Bargaining unit members, while not required 
to pass an exam about their rights as a condition of employment, are 
nonetheless relatively likely to be aware (or at least constructively aware) of 
their First Amendment rights, even without the Hudson notice.  Information 
about union dissenters‘ rights is remarkably plentiful and easily accessed 
online;250 in addition, employers seeking to weaken employees‘ ties to a 
union may be anxious to provide information about opt-out rights. 
That bargaining unit members could plausibly be expected to exercise 
their Abood rights without the benefit of meta rights like the Hudson notice 
is underscored by the experience of individuals who object to union 
membership on religious grounds.  These employees often have a statutory 
entitlement to an accommodation from their union, such as the opportunity 
to donate the amount of union dues or the agency fee to a charity,251 but do 
not necessarily receive specific notice of their rights to object.252  Further, 
once they do learn of their rights, they generally exercise them by 
contacting the union and affirmatively requesting an accommodation; if one 
is not provided, they may sue.253  Likewise, objectors in right to work states 
do not necessarily receive individual notices stating that they are not 
 
 248. See, e.g., Leah Barkoukis, Michigan Union Publishes “Freeloaders” List of Workers 
Who Opted Out, TOWNHALL.COM (Feb. 13, 2014), http://townhall.com/tipsheet/ 
leahbarkoukis/2014/02/13/michigan-union-publishes-freeloaders-list-n1794694. 
 249. The Multistate Bar Examination tests First Amendment freedoms. See NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, 2013 MULTISTATE BAR EXAMINATION INFORMATION 
BOOKLET 8, available at http://www.law2.byu.edu/page/categories/student_resources/bar_ 
prep/2013/MBE_Information_Booklet.pdf. 
 250. A Google search for ―mandatory union dues‖ leads to a host of information about 
objectors‘ rights and ongoing lawsuits challenging union dues and fees assessments. Google 
Search for ―mandatory union dues,‖ GOOGLE, http://www.google.com (search ―mandatory 
union dues‖; then click search). 
 251. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 252. They may receive generalized notice via the notice regarding Title VII rights that 
many employers are required to post.  This poster notifies employees that they may seek a 
reasonable accommodation of their religious practices. See EEOC, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY IS THE LAW, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/employers/upload/eeoc_ 
self_print_poster.pdf. 
 253. An Employee’s Guide to Union Dues and Religious Do Nots, NAT‘L RIGHT TO WORK 
LEGAL DEF. FOUND., available at http://www.nrtw.org/ro2.htm#ro2FN8 (last visited Oct. 19, 
2014). 
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required to pay any money to their union,254 though significant numbers of 
employees nonetheless succeed in invoking their rights under such laws.255 
Thus, the largest barrier to self-help in the union and bar association 
context is the lack of publicly available knowledge about how the agency 
fee is calculated.  Yet the Hudson procedure goes well beyond remedying 
this informational gap.  Moreover, even if Hudson is explicable in terms of 
self-help, Knox is not—there is simply no plausible case to be made that the 
need to mail a form in order to opt out imposes the type of self-help barrier 
that motivate meta rights in other contexts. 
4.   Agricultural Advertising 
Finally, the least significant obstacle to self-help, and correspondingly 
the least compelling case for meta rights, comes in cases like United Foods. 
First, the concept of Miranda-style coercion means little in the context of a 
business entity.  It is equally difficult to imagine how a knowledge deficit 
could arise:  not only will producers have all the factual knowledge 
necessary to discover a claim, they are also likely to be represented by 
counsel.  Thus, there exists neither the knowledge gap nor the institutional 
coercion that has justified meta rights in other contexts. 
Given the relevance of self-help to the establishment of meta rights in 
other contexts—and the lack of alternate explanation for meta rights in the 
compelled speech context—the current allocation of meta compelled speech 
rights is simply bizarre.  For example, it is incongruous that, in cases 
governed by United Foods, marketing associations may not even assess 
contributions for generic advertising.  In other words, these producers, who 
are most able to engage in self-help to avoid compelled speech or 
subsidization, need not even opt out.256  Conversely, public school children 
and their parents can make the strongest case for meta rights to defend 
against compelled speech and subsidization, yet they are not entitled to any 
meta rights at all.257  Finally, union members and attorneys receive 
disproportionately robust meta rights, despite the lack of barriers to self-
help.258 
 
 254. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-7-110 (2013) (providing that employers may post notice 
of right to work law and must furnish notice upon request of an employee); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 50-1-206(b) (2012) (employers may post or distribute notice of state right to work 
law provisions). 
 255. See Henry S. Farber, Union Membership in the United States:  The Divergence 
Between the Public and Private Sectors 28 (Princeton Univ., Working Paper No. 503, 2005), 
available at http://harris.princeton.edu/pubs/pdfs/503.pdf. 
 256. Counterintuitively, it may have been the very ease of objection that led the Court to 
strike down the program altogether; the Court‘s unstated assumption may have been that no 
producer would ever contribute to generic advertising absent compulsion, and that therefore 
it was a waste of time to do anything but eliminate the program. 
 257. See supra Part II.B. 
 258. See supra Part II.B. 
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C.   Structuring Meta Rights 
Meta rights most often do little more than provide potential dissenters 
with notice, though some may do more to facilitate or even encourage 
objectors to exercise their rights.  This section separately considers notice 
and structural meta rights, focusing on their potential unintended effects on 
institutional or willing individual speakers. 
1.   Notice Rights 
As their name suggests, notice rights simply inform individuals about 
their rights; both the Miranda warning and the Hudson notice are examples.  
When a nongovernmental actor, such as a union or bar association, is 
required to issue a notice regarding compelled speech or subsidization, an 
irony arises:  the notice itself is a form of compelled speech, which in turn 
raises its own First Amendment question.259 
The Court has previously recognized that state-mandated disclosures by 
private speakers are subject to First Amendment scrutiny.  In Zauderer v. 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel,260 the Court reviewed Ohio‘s requirement 
that attorneys advertising their availability on a contingent fee basis also 
disclose that unsuccessful clients would be required to pay costs.261  The 
Court conducted an undue burden analysis, weighing Ohio‘s interest in the 
compelled disclosure against the burden imposed on attorneys.262  It easily 
concluded that the requirement did not impose an undue burden on 
attorneys; conversely, the Court observed that the notice protected 
consumers who were likely to assume that bringing a losing case would be 
free, when in fact they might incur substantial costs.263  Thus, the disclosure 
requirement passed constitutional muster. 
Zauderer involved a burden on commercial speech, which is entitled to 
less protection than ideological speech.264  In Citizens United, in contrast, 
the Court considered the standard applicable to compelled disclaimers and 
 
 259. See David Fagundes, State Actors As First Amendment Speakers, 100 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1637, 1641, 1643–44 (2006) (noting that ―[c]ourts and commentators alike have long 
dismissed the notion that the Speech Clause could serve as a source of constitutional 
protection for government speech,‖ but observing that a small number of courts have held 
that the First Amendment can protect state or local government speakers whose speech has 
been limited by the federal government). 
 260. 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
 261. Id. at 652–53. 
 262. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 250 (2010) 
(explaining that under Zauderer, ―[u]njustified or unduly burdensome disclosure 
requirements offend the First Amendment by chilling protected speech, but ‗an advertiser‘s 
rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to 
the State‘s interest in preventing deception of consumers‘‖); see also Nicole B. Cásarez, 
Don’t Tell Me What to Say:  Compelled Commercial Speech & the First Amendment, 63 MO. 
L. REV. 929, 952–53 (1998) (describing the Zauderer test and observing that ―commercial 
disclosure requirements have been subjected to less stringent First Amendment analysis‖ 
than compelled ―political, religious, or ideological speech‖). 
 263. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652–53 & n.15. 
 264. Id. at 637. 
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disclosures under Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act.265  The Court upheld 
both requirements, but it first applied ―‗exacting scrutiny,‘ which requires a 
‗substantial relation‘ between the disclosure requirement and a ‗sufficiently 
important‘ governmental interest.‖266  In particular, the Court relied on the 
government‘s interest in providing information to the electorate.267  The 
Court did not quantify the costs of the disclosure or disclaimer 
requirements, though it did consider as one cost the possibility that 
disclosure would chill donors‘ speech.268  Although the Court deemed this 
possibility insufficient to defeat the disclosure requirement, it implied that it 
might decide differently a case with a clear record of ―threats or reprisals‖ 
against donors.269 
At a minimum, then, notice meta rights—to the extent owed by private 
associations—should be subject to the Zauderer test.  However disclosure 
requirements that, like the Hudson notice, are imposed as conditions of 
engaging in political speech should receive stricter scrutiny under Citizens 
United.  Undoubtedly, informing institutionally affiliated individuals of 
their rights to avoid compelled speech and subsidization is a governmental 
interest that is at least as significant as providing information to the 
electorate.  Likewise, there is a close relationship between that interest and 
disclosure.  Thus, there is a strong argument in favor of the constitutionality 
of requiring unions or bar associations to disclose information about the 
right against compelled speech or subsidization.  However, this abstract 
analysis should not conclude the inquiry.  There remains the fact-specific 
question of whether there is an alternative method of notifying dissenters of 
their rights, while imposing a smaller burden on institutional speakers.270 
Hudson is more burdensome than the disclosure requirements approved 
in either Zauderer or Citizens United, where the respective speakers had to 
append a short statement to communications that they were making 
 
 265. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 367 (2010).  The disclaimer consists of a 
statement, to be delivered during any televised electioneering communication, that 
―[advertiser] is responsible for the content of this advertising,‖ that the communication was 
not authorized by a candidate or candidate committee, and that provides the name and 
address of the person or group that funded the advertisement. Id. at 366.  The required 
disclosure statement, applicable to anyone spending more than $10,000 in a calendar year on 
electioneering communications, was to be filed with the FEC and list ―the person making the 
expenditure, the amount of the expenditure, the election to which the communication was 
directed, and the names of certain contributors.‖ Id. 
 266. Id. at 366–67 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64, 66 (1976)). 
 267. Id. at 367. 
 268. Id. at 370. 
 269. Id.; see also Leslie Kendrick, Disclosure and Its Discontents, 27 J.L. & POL. 575, 
575–76 (2012) (―Compelled disclosure . . . has long been assessed not by its purposes, but by 
its detrimental effects on expressive association.‖). 
 270. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 490–91 (1995) (holding, in the 
commercial speech context, that ―the availability of [less speech-restrictive alternatives], all 
of which could advance the Government‘s asserted interest in a manner less intrusive to 
respondent‘s First Amendment rights, indicates that [statute] is more extensive than 
necessary‖); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending 
Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2422 (1996) (stating that ―[a] law is not narrowly 
tailored if there are less speech-restrictive means available that would serve the interest 
essentially as well as would the speech restriction‖). 
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anyway, or file a single disclosure report with a government agency.  And, 
it is not clear that the additional burden imposed by the individualized 
Hudson notice is justified, given the available alternatives.  For example, 
bargaining unit members could be notified of their rights via a posted 
notice, similar to the notices that advise employees of many other 
workplace rights.271  This would not work for attorneys, who do not all 
work in the same place, but a notice displayed prominently on the bar 
association‘s website could prove equally useful.  Alternatively, 
employers—who, after all, are parties to collective bargaining agreements 
imposing union security clauses—could play a greater role in informing 
employees of their rights.272  They, rather than unions, could give 
employees notice of their Abood rights.273  For example, during new 
employee orientation—when the employee must fill out countless other 
forms and make numerous other elections related to retirement withholding, 
health insurance electives, and other benefits—the employee could also be 
provided with the Hudson notice and a copy of the paperwork necessary to 
opt out of the non-germane portion of union dues.  Similarly, employees 
could then change their agency fee elections once annually, just as they 
change their insurance elections during the annual ―open enrollment‖ 
period. 
The existence of these alternative methods of notifying dissenters of their 
First Amendment rights calls into question whether the Hudson procedure 
would survive the Zauderer/Citizens United inquiry.  And, this is not the 
only aspect of the Hudson/Knox process that implicates the First 
Amendment rights of institutional speakers. 
2.   Opt-Ins, Opt-Outs, and Sticky Defaults 
Knox called into question the continuing validity of the opt-out default in 
the union dues context based on a posited mismatch between the likely 
preferences of employees and the likely effects of an opt-out as compared to 
an opt-in.  Accordingly, this subsection begins by evaluating whether Knox 
correctly assumed that most individuals who pay full freight without joining 
their union have a latent preference not to pay, and concludes that few 
meaningful predictions can be made about these individuals‘ preferences.  
 
 271. See “EEO is the Law” Poster, EEOC, available at http://www1.eeoc.gov/ 
employers/poster.cfm (last visited Oct. 19, 2014) (stating that ―[t]he law requires an 
employer to post a notice describing the Federal laws prohibiting job discrimination based 
on race, color, sex, national origin, religion, age, equal pay, disability or genetic 
information‖). 
 272. Of course, individual unions may make the choice to continue providing the Hudson 
notice themselves, preferring not to cede control of this process to employers.  However, it is 
not necessarily the case that every union will make this choice, particularly where they enjoy 
stable and long-term bargaining relationships with employers. 
 273. This does not solve the problem of how to provide potential objectors with notice of 
the union‘s calculation of the agency fee.  This disclosure could still be provided by the 
union, either directly to objectors or via the employer, or—similar to the disclosure required 
in Citizens United, which is submitted to the Federal Election Commission—via the 
Department of Labor website. 
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Then, drawing on principles of behavioral psychology, this subpart plays 
out the consequences of Knox‘s novel First Amendment principle that 
speech defaults can violate the First Amendment if they do not accord with 
the likely preferences of covered individuals.  It argues that if an opt-out 
violates the First Amendment (because some individuals fail to overcome 
the speech default), then an opt-in default should pose a problem of the 
same magnitude where different individuals fail to overcome the non-
speech default.  Thus, this subsection concludes that, taking Knox‘s First 
Amendment premises at face value, an opt-in default should be as 
problematic as an opt-out default. 
Among behavioral psychologists, it is relatively uncontroversial that 
switching from an opt-out to an opt-in default could have an effect on 
individuals‘ outcomes.  That is to say, it is plausible that the choice of opt-
in/opt-out default could actually (if unconsciously) result in workers 
adopting different statuses vis-à-vis their unions.  If this fact has First 
Amendment valence, then courts should be equally cognizant of the effects 
of either default. 
To begin, it is worth asking what behavioral psychology has to contribute 
to constitutional law, and particularly to First Amendment analysis.  Paul 
Horwitz has observed that ―there is a natural fit between behavioral analysis 
and First Amendment law. Much of our current free speech jurisprudence is 
based on the assumption that the government should not regulate speech 
because, in an unregulated marketplace, people will be perfectly capable of 
responding rationally to speech.‖274  Behavioral psychology is devoted to 
understanding the ―cognitive failings‖ that prevent people from responding 
to situations rationally.275  Thus, a more sophisticated understanding of 
these cognitive failings will allow courts and legislatures to tailor 
restrictions on speech more carefully, achieving better results while 
lessening burdens on speech.276  More importantly, the Court itself acts on 
assumptions about behavior in compelled speech cases.  For example, the 
Abood Court relied on the possibility that bargaining unit members would 
free ride on other workers‘ payments to their union in deciding to permit the 
agency shop.277  Similarly, as I discuss in detail below, the Knox Court 
drew on its own set of assumptions about the likely preferences of 
bargaining unit members in deciding to require an opt-in regime for 
midyear dues increases.  In other words, the Court already bases rights and 
meta rights regimes on assumptions about human behavior; introducing 
behavioral psychology into the mix simply puts these assumptions on 
firmer empirical footing.278 
 
 274. Paul Horwitz, Free Speech As Risk Analysis:  Heuristics, Biases, and Institutions in 
the First Amendment, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 6 (2003). 
 275. Id. at 10. 
 276. Id. (―[B]ehavioral analysis may offer valuable insights into two crucial First 
Amendment questions:  how we decide whether particular speech acts may have unduly 
harmful effects, and who should make such decisions.‖). 
 277. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 224 (1977). 
 278. Such considerations are not limited to the union context.  For example, the Court in 
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011), considered behavioral incentives in 
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The Knox majority adopted an opt-in regime based largely on its 
conjecture that bargaining unit members who, after receiving the Hudson 
notice, had neither joined the union nor opted out of funding its non-
germane activities probably did not want to fund union political speech.279  
Essentially, the Court assumed that many of these employees had not opted 
out because, while they preferred not to pay, their preferences not to pay 
were weaker than their preferences not to devote the time or attention to 
filling out the necessary paperwork.280  However, this conclusion was 
flawed; in fact, one can say very little about the likely preferences of 
employees who pay full freight without joining the union. 
Why might a bargaining unit employee not join a union, but still pay the 
full amount of union dues?  The Knox Court viewed this state of affairs as 
contradictory, evidencing a mistake or lapse in attention by the 
employee.281  Yet, there are at least two plausible explanations for it.  First, 
there are rational reasons not to join a union even if one agrees with (and 
wants to fund) the union‘s political speech.  For example, bargaining unit 
members who do not join the union are not subject to union discipline.282  
Thus, bargaining unit members who support the union‘s efforts beyond the 
bargaining table, but who do not want to run the risk of eventually facing 
union discipline might affirmatively and intentionally choose to pay full 
freight without joining the union. 
The second explanation, though, may be the more powerful one:  
behavioral research shows that ―[d]efaults are sticky, and overcoming 
inertia is difficult.‖283  This research suggests two important reasons that 
 
evaluating the constitutionality of a restriction on the sale or use of certain information about 
doctors‘ prescribing habits by pharmaceutical marketers.  Specifically, the Vermont statute 
under review restricted marketers from using physicians‘ information where the physicians 
had not consented to such use. Id. at 2668–69.  The Court observed that the law ―might 
burden less speech if it came into operation only after an individual choice‖—in other words, 
if it applied only to physicians that opted into coverage, rather than requiring physicians to 
opt out of coverage. Id. at 2669 (adding that even this change ―would not necessarily save‖ 
the statute).  Likewise, the Shutts Court also focused on behavioral incentives in choosing an 
opt-out regime (rejecting the defendant‘s call for an opt-in). See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 813–14 (1985).  The Court based its analysis in significant part on the 
economic interests, and associated likely courses of action, of absent class members. Id. at 
813. 
 279. Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int‘l Union Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2290 (2012). 
 280. Id. (discussing ―employees who might not qualify as active ‗dissenters‘ but who 
would nonetheless prefer to keep their own money‖). 
 281. Id. (posing the rhetorical question:  ―And isn‘t it likely that most employees who 
choose not to join the union that represents their bargaining unit prefer not to pay the full 
amount of union dues?‖). 
 282. See, e.g., Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 435 (1969). 
 283. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. 2010, 2036 (2013); see also Gary Minda, Freedom and Democracy in a World 
Governed by Finance:  Habermas and the Crisis in Europe:  A Free Labor Response, 10 
RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 244, 269 (2013) (noting that Justice Breyer, in Knox, ―adopted 
the conclusion of Sunstein and Thaler in finding that default rules play an important role in 
influencing behavior of individuals who do not have ‗well defined preferences‘‖); Cass 
Sunstein & Richard Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1159, 1171 (2003); Brian Olney, Paycheck Protection or Paycheck Deception?  When 
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some workers fail to overcome the default (here, to pay full freight without 
joining the union).  One is simple inertia—the employees may not have 
made a decision at all, or they may have made a decision in the abstract, but 
then failed to complete the necessary paperwork in time.  For these workers, 
there is no reason to assume that failure to overcome the default indicates a 
desire not to pay for non-chargeable union expenses.  True, it is possible 
that if required to make a choice, they would opt out.  Yet it is also possible 
that they would resolve the supposed inconsistency by joining the union and 
continuing to pay.284 
A second reason for default stickiness is that employees may (correctly 
or not) see the default as an implied endorsement or expectation.  ―People 
interpret defaults as a recommended course of action set out by policy 
makers.‖285  Relatedly, individuals may take defaults as signals about what 
most people do, meaning that ―following a simple heuristic of imitation 
could lead to its widespread adoption.‖286  In other words, an opt-out 
default might suggest to employees that most people pay full freight, 
leading them to do the same in order to avoid being seen as free riders.  
Conversely, an opt-in default might suggest paying is extraordinary, and 
employees might decide that only suckers pay when they don‘t have to.287 
If employees see either implied endorsement or description in the default 
choice, they make a different decision than they would without the default.  
Likewise, employees who are driven by inertia will have different outcomes 
depending on the default.  This is significant because it suggests that 
beyond simply allowing non-dissenters to express their independently held 
desires, court-imposed defaults and associated procedures can cause a larger 
or smaller number of people to pay full freight for union representation.  In 
other words, opt-in defaults can have the effect of restricting the amount of 
money available to labor unions with which to engage in political speech 
 
Government ―Subsidies‖ Silence Political Speech 13–15 (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with Fordham Law Review). 
 284. Behavioral psychology also suggests a reason that the Knox majority presumed that 
full-freight/non-union bargaining unit members preferred not to pay for the union‘s political 
speech.  Research has proven the existence of the ―availability heuristic,‖ in which people 
―assess the likelihood of risks by asking how readily examples come to mind.‖ RICHARD H. 
THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 25 (2008).  Knox was filed by a group of plaintiffs 
who did, in fact, vigorously object to paying for the SEIU‘s non-chargeable expenses.  Thus, 
it is unsurprising that the majority deemed it likely that other employees also objected to 
making these payments. 
 285. Eric J. Johnson & Daniel J. Goldstein, Decisions in Default, in THE BEHAVIORAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 421 (Edlar Shafir ed., 2012). 
 286. Id. (citing Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 283, at 1171). 
 287. See Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 652 (2006) (explaining, in the context of private law, that ―a 
transactor might fear that proposing an opt-out from the default will dissuade his potential 
counterparty from entering into the agreement,‖ because ―the counterparty will suspect that 
the proposer‘s decision to deviate from the norm and use an unfamiliar provision . . . is a 
‗trick‘‖). 
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independent of the level of support for the unions‘ speech among 
bargaining unit members.288 
Given this background, Knox‘s First Amendment analysis suggests that 
the opt-in default would infringe upon First Amendment rights because it 
would deter some bargaining unit members from paying full freight, 
thereby decreasing the funds available for union political advocacy.  But 
this is not all; in addition, the rights of two distinct sets of bargaining unit 
members would also be burdened.  First, there are those who overcome the 
default to pay full freight (with or without joining the union), who lose the 
opportunity to have their voices amplified by the presence of those who are 
unwittingly opted out of funding union political speech.289  Second, there 
are those who are influenced not to pay full freight by the opt-in regime—in 
other words, those who are dissuaded from funding political speech because 
of Court-created meta rights.  Even if these individuals use the money they 
save to engage in other political speech, they have still lost an opportunity 
to take part in a ―collective effort‖ by which ―individuals can make their 
views known, when, individually, their voices would be faint or lost.‖290 
Therefore, if the Court concludes that an opt-out regime violates the First 
Amendment, then the inevitable presence of other workers, who would be 
similarly disadvantaged by an opt-in regime, should eliminate that 
possibility as well.  In that case, there is a third possibility that the Court did 
not consider but that holds promise to protect even the quasi-dissenters with 
whom the Knox Court was concerned:  instead of an opt-in or an opt-out 
default, institutions could simply require affiliated individuals to make an 
affirmative choice.291  Thus, unions, employers, or bar associations might 
ask employees and attorneys to make a choice between paying full freight 
and paying the agency fee.  The advantage of such a scheme is that it avoids 
 
 288. It is not clear that the converse is true.  At least one study suggests that opt-out 
defaults do not significantly affect individual choices, and that the results of an opt-out 
default closely approximate the results of requiring individuals to make affirmative choices. 
See Olney, supra note 283, at 14–15.  However, this research was performed in the context 
of organ donation; additional research is needed to confirm that the same conclusion would 
hold in the union or bar dues context. 
 289. Evelyn Brody, Entrance, Voice, and Exit:  The Constitutional Bounds of the Right of 
Association, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 821, 839 (2002) (arguing that ―[t]he Court conceived of 
the right of association as belonging to the individual members—as augmenting the power of 
their individual speech‖).  The Court has recognized the First Amendment interests 
associated with union speech. See Int‘l Ass‘n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 773 
(1961) (―[T]he fact that these expenditures are made for political activities is an additional 
reason for reluctance to impose . . . an injunctive remedy.  Whatever may be the powers of 
Congress or the States to forbid unions altogether to make various types of political 
expenditures . . . many of the expenditures involved in the present case are made for the 
purpose of disseminating information as to candidates and programs and publicizing the 
positions of the unions on them.  As to such expenditures an injunction would work a 
restraint on the expression of political ideas which might be offensive to the First 
Amendment.‖). 
 290. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981); see 
also Street, 367 U.S. at 773 (―[T]he majority also has an interest in stating its views without 
being silenced by the dissenters.‖). 
 291. See Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 39–41 (2013) 
(discussing ―active choosing‖ as an alternative to a default regime). 
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suggesting to individuals that the state believes there is a ―right answer,‖ 
and instead conveys the message that speech and silence are equally valid 
alternatives.  While there are some downsides to requiring an active 
choice—for example, some people may prefer not to be forced to expend 
mental energy on weighing options292—this is the only way to avoid a 
situation in which the government plays a role in determining whether 
workers or attorneys will engage in political speech, thereby implicating the 
First Amendment under Knox‘s logic.293 
CONCLUSION 
The Court‘s present ad hoc approach to meta rights has produced an 
incoherent set of results.  This is especially true in the First Amendment 
context, where those most able to show coercion, information deficits, or 
both receive no meta rights, while others receive extensive meta rights.  
Accordingly, the Court should undertake a full-scale reconsideration of 
meta rights, beginning with the First Amendment context.  In doing so, the 
Court should begin by addressing when and why meta rights are called for 
at all.  Next, to the extent the Court concludes that speech defaults implicate 
the First Amendment, it should draw on advances in behavioral psychology 
to anticipate the effects of meta rights on the speech of willing speakers as 
well as dissenters. 
 
 292. Id. at 47 (discussing prospect that active choosing might be ―quite unwelcome‖ 
because of the time and learning curve demanded in making a choice). 
 293. A more systematic approach to meta rights questions will have significance far 
beyond the compelled speech and subsidization context.  For example, some statutory 
schemes also create meta rights.  To take one example, the NLRB recently promulgated a 
rule requiring employers to notify their employees of their rights under the NLRA. 76 Fed. 
Reg. 54006-01 (Aug. 30, 2011).  To date, the rule has been struck down on statutory grounds 
by two circuits, with the D.C. Circuit holding that the rule violated employer‘s statutory 
speech rights. Nat‘l Ass‘n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 721 F.3d 947, 955 (2013).  Although both 
decisions rested on the NLRA rather than the Constitution, the approach outlined in this 
Article could also be usefully applied to reconciling employer and employee interests arising 
under the Act as well. See generally Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 721 F.3d 152 (4th 
Cir. 2013). 
